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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the civil rights movement in Danville, Virginia, and focuses 
on the tactics employed by prominent white men who, because they controlled the city’s 
leading institutions of power, were able to effectively squelch the movement by the end 
of the 1963 summer. This paper also traces how the Danville movement followed the 
path of the classical phase of the national civil rights movement, and represents the 
manner in which broader trends and events played out in small southern cities. The 
Danville movement began with a student-led sit-in at the whites only public library a few 
months after the sit-ins in Greensboro, North Carolina. Unsure of how to handle such a 
show of protest against segregated order in Danville, the all-white city council struggled 
to decide how to proceed. Many of the councilmen drew upon the library’s significance 
as the last Confederate capitol to defend the continued exclusion of black citizens from 
the library, while others argued the white voters should decide. Eventually, the federal 
government intervened, and the library was officially open to all in September of 1960. 
Three years later, in May 1963, a direct protest movement began shortly after the massive 
protests in Birmingham, Alabama. Civil rights demonstrators once again surprised 
Danville with a show of protest, and though white leaders initially struggled to confront 
the movement, they later created a coalition of white resistance to fight back against the 
movement. The Danville police borrowed violent control tactics from police chief Bull 
Connor in Birmingham, the city council passed laws to criminalize the movement and its 
participants, and the court system made sure all were convicted of their supposed crimes. 
The Danville civil rights movement was brought to an end by August of 1963 because of 
 iv  
the social, judicial, and political power held by local white institutions who worked 






Screams filled the air as black demonstrators ran for cover from high-pressure 
water hoses directed at them by the local fire department. The police chief looked on to 
survey the sudden violence that erupted as a direct result of his own orders given to the 
men, his all-white police force. As the hoses washed demonstrators down the street, 
police began beating those who had fallen down and released their dogs into the crowd. 
Deputized garbage collectors joined in the chase and arrest of demonstrators, most of 
whom were teenagers and young adults. It was a bloody and chaotic event, and many 
were severely injured and sent to the hospital for medical treatment. To anyone familiar 
with the American civil rights narrative of the 1950s and 1960s, this story sounds like one 
that belongs to the 1963 marches in Birmingham, Alabama. However, this scene was not 
one from Birmingham at all. The scene was one from Danville, Virginia, and, as one 
demonstrator would recall fifty years later, “Danville was worse than Birmingham”.1 
The Danville movement received a significant amount of resources by large and 
well-funded national civil rights organizations. The Danville Christian Progressive 
Association (DCPA) was an official affiliate office of the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC), and brought Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., to Danville multiple times 
in 1963. King was one of the most well-known leaders of the movement, and this was a 
big deal to a small city like Danville. Additionally, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC) came to the city and brought a team of activists, journalists, 
 




strategists, and a photographer to document and draw attention to the movement. SNCC 
also taught demonstrators how to employ certain techniques to protest nonviolently while 
marching, singing, and coming under arrest. Additionally, plenty of locals were donating 
as much money as they could to sustain the movement financially. Yet, even with all 
these incredible resources provided to them, the Danville movement was quickly 
extinguished. 
Thus, the puzzle left to solve in the aftermath is, “How?” How could so much 
help from well-funded national organizations not result in a win for local civil rights in 
Danville? Danville was a small city in 1960 with a little over 46,000 residents according 
to the U.S. Census, and at the height of the movement an estimated few hundred 
individuals protested at one time. This was a relatively small number in comparison to 
some of the larger, more well-known civil rights movements. The movement in 
Birmingham, Alabama, brought out more than 1,000 protesters to participate in the 
Children’s March, and the famous march from Selma to Montgomery saw more than 
25,000 participants. It is possible that an argument could be made there were some errors 
on the part of the Danville movement’s leaders. Whether they hoped to secure more press 
coverage or simply felt famous activists would help their cause in some other way, 
Danville leaders seemed desperate to grasp onto prominent national figures like Martin 
Luther King Jr., even though in the end he abandoned them. It is also arguable that the 
disagreements over how to proceed with the protest negatively affect the execution, 
longevity, and effectiveness of the movement. However, the evidence points to entirely 




This thesis argues that the answer lies in the strategies employed by Danville’s 
leading white authorities, which were in charge of the city’s political and judicial 
institutions, in their efforts to work collectively and curtail any significant progress for 
civil rights in Danville. A national shift in civil rights since the Brown v. Board decision 
made clear that the power of Jim Crow was waning, and white authorities in Danville 
were willing to do anything to hold on to the power they held in the city. Any 
concessions to the black community would take Danville one step closer to full civil 
rights, an act that would surely weaken the powerful hold white power had in Danville 
law and politics. This thesis traces the tactics utilized by those in power in Danville as 
they fought against the federal government and their own citizens to resist significant 
civil rights achievements in Danville. Even though outside organizations brought key 
resources to the Danville movement, there was one thing they could not bring with them: 
political power. The fact was that white authorities in Danville held all of the political 
power it would have taken to make the movement truly successful, yet were unwilling to 
allow any of that power to go towards the demands being made by black citizens.  
Chapter 1, “Danville, 1960 - May”, examines the response to the library sit-in by 
the Danville City Council, the rhetoric the councilmen used, and the methods they 
employed as they were faced with a situation they were vastly unprepared for. Chapter 2, 
“Danville, 1963” looks at the reaction by the city council, Danville Police Department, 
and judicial system to the direct protest action that began in May of 1963. More prepared 
this time, these institutions worked together to create a wall of white resistance to the 
movement by intentionally creating laws intended to criminalize the movement and its 




They beat the movement down, literally and metaphorically, to tire it of both people and 
monetary resources by carrying out mass arrests and violently responding to protests. 
Chapter 3, “Danville, 1963 – July”, takes a close look at the legal fallout of the Danville 
movement as the protest phase dwindled. This chapter leans heavily on court transcripts 
to provide insights into how the judicial system prevented any semblance of a fair trial 
for those arrested during the protests, as the judge and city attorneys held the power to 
dominate the courtroom. The legal battles, which began in July of 1963, would stretch on 
for an entire decade.  
 The sources used for this paper were both the most exciting and most frustrating 
part of the project. The Danville movement has largely escaped the attention of 
historians, except for a few shorter articles through the state library in Richmond, 
Encyclopedia Virginia, and online journals held articles authored by historians and 
researchers that either focused on Danville or utilized it as a prominent example in their 
writing. Researching for primary sources through the ongoing Coronavirus pandemic was 
especially challenging. Most of the sources I used for this paper were not digitized, and it 
wasn’t until July that the libraries were re-opened to researchers. Even then, the 
availability of time and resources differed from place to place. Danville Public Library 
has yet to open its microfilm machine up again for public use, which made me even more 
grateful for the Register articles I collected years earlier during an undergraduate project. 
The lack of accessibility was extremely frustrating, which led me to begin extensive 
internet searches to find people that may still be alive who participated in the movement. 
I spent hours online googling old phone numbers, calling places of business, sending 




back. This was extremely rewarding, as the people it led me to whom I was able to speak 
with brought a new life to the paper that gave me a deeper appreciation for all of the 
research I was doing. It was also these personal phone calls that led me to some of my 
more crucial sources, such as the Juby Towler book I discuss in Chapter 2.  
 Throughout my thesis I rely heavily on the reporting by the Danville Register, a 
newspaper that is still in print today. The Danville Public Library has copies of the 
newspaper on microfilm, most of which are very difficult to read either due to quick 
scanning or old equipment that failed to capture the images very well. I tried to return 
many times over the summer and fall for the purposes of gathering more for this project, 
but the microfilm machine remained unavailable for public use due to the pandemic. 
Thankfully, the Sutherlin Mansion was able to dig up several binders from a forgotten 
researcher that had many copies of the articles I needed for this project. I was unable to 
find any institutional history on the Register itself, but multiple individuals relayed to me 
it was clearly the “white paper”, and owned by a white family in the city. I rely mostly on 
reporting from the Register, rather than other newspapers, television broadcasts, or radio 
clips because it is the source that holds the most robust collection of accessible 
information. Other sources of media that may have covered the Danville events, 
including the Bee which I only reference once or twice in the thesis, were nearly 
impossible to find or access.  
The Register is important for several reasons. Primarily, it serves as a detailed 
record of events throughout the 1960 desegregation of the public library and subsequent 
protesting during the summer of 1963. It is an invaluable resource when examining how 




citizens advocating for desegregation and better employment in the city. The newspaper 
also provided a public platform for city leaders to voice their moral judgements as the 
civil rights movement progressed through the early 1960s. It privileged the perspectives 
of the white authorities, and when Danville citizens read their paper every day, it was 
these perspectives that told them what to think about the ongoing civil rights movement. 
The only statements the newspaper would include for black citizens were ones of 
negative commentary on the movement, as the paper continuously sought to undermine 
the individuals participating in the movement.  
 I also extensively utilize legal documents from the ongoing court trials that took 
place after the 1963 protest movement. Between multiple trips to Richmond and back 
home collecting scans of these documents, I somehow ended up with over 1,000 pages in 
legal paperwork to sift through. These were incredibly insightful for connecting together 
the legal implications of the movement, which I incorporate throughout my thesis. The 
first of the many trials that took place were for the convictions of several movement 
leaders in violation of Judge Aiken’s injunction against parading, which he enacted in 
early June. This injunction was based on an Antebellum slave law in Virginia, and by the 
end of the trials these black leaders were found guilty and sentenced to fines and jail 
time. The court records for this case also held insight into how the system of white power 
operated inside the city courtroom. The judge and city prosecutors clearly held the upper 
hand, while the NAACP defense lawyers were interrupted, overlooked, and ignored 
throughout the entire trial. The appeals petitions I later found stashed in the basement of 
the Danville Police Department’s records room showed how the city council and police 




Judge Aiken’s injunction did not seem to deter the demonstrators much, thus the city 
council changed the parading ordinance to intentionally criminalize any ongoing protests. 
They enacted, executed, and punished individuals under this new law that was never even 
made public or legally published. These revelations were incredible, and really helped me 
tie in some of the heaviest points I attempt to make in the paper.  
 The personal interviews I was able to conduct really helped me understand what 
the situation in Danville was like during the civil rights movement. Even though it has 
been almost sixty years, the people I interviewed still held sharp, clear memories from the 
traumatic events of the 1963 summer. Most were reasonably easy to track down. I used a 
local phone book to find Jerry Williams Jr. and reached out to High Street Baptist Church 
on Facebook, who put me in touch with Carolyn Wilson. The Zellners were the hardest to 
track down. I knew Robert and Dorothy Zellner, two key SNCC activists in Danville 
during the movement, had the potential to provide me with essential information for my 
thesis. I never got in touch with Robert, but I was finally able to get in contact Dorothy 
after leaving several messages on (unknown to me) her work, home, and cell phone. 
Dorothy and I chatted for almost two hours when we were finally able to speak, and she 
admitted she still thought of her time in Danville even though so many decades had 
passed. In 2007 when the city placed a historical marker for Bloody Monday in front of 
the courthouse, she read about it online and printed out a picture to keep for herself. She 
had just as many questions for me about the city now as I did for her, and together she 
helped me fill in the questions I had on SNCC’s role in the city during the hot 1963 




she told me that out of all the places she traveled with SNCC, including Mississippi, 
Danville was by far the most violent she ever personally experienced.  
I found myself with an incredible source base, but also one that is far from 
perfect. As I surveyed what I had collected, the overwhelming majority of sources I 
found myself in possession of  were white-authored sources. This is, at least in part, what 
led me to construct a project that provided insights into the methods and strategies used 
by white authorities in Danville to combat the local civil rights movement. Most of my 
sources stem from institutions, thus a significant amount of personal information on the 
individuals I highlight in the thesis is lacking. The thesis could benefit greatly from an 
analysis of the primary authority figures I include, such as the town council members, 
John Carter, James Ferguson, Judge Archibald Aiken, Chief Eugene McCain, Juby 
Towler, and city mayor Julian Stinson. Their personal stories have the potential to add an 
even deeper level of understanding to their actions taken during the early 1960s in 
Danville, but those records do not seem to exist. Additionally, though I tried to 
incorporate as many black voices as I could, there could still be more here to speak to the 
mid-20th century struggles in Danville. This thesis lays the groundwork for a much larger 
project that may take place one day, as there is still much to explore.  
 Throughout my thesis I work with the contrasting ideals and actions of “insiders” 
versus “outsiders” quite a bit. The “insiders” are those who held the power in the city of 
Danville. They are the white men who ran the city, held elected offices, and enforced its 
laws. Not all of the men in power fought as ferociously as some to maintain the city’s 
social and political order, but all in power benefited from the systematic attack and 




on two primary forms. First, the “outsiders” were those who, although they were pysicaly 
located within the city of Danville, were outside of the city’s primary institutions of 
power. The demonstrators themselves were considered “outsiders” by local authorities 
and the broader public as they fought for ideals that did not fall in line with the agenda of 
white city leadership. Secondly, “outsiders” represent any authority located outside of the 
city that white leadership felt was unfairly intervening in Danville.  
During the fight over the library in 1960, the NAACP and federal court system 
were the outside enemies who were pushing their unwanted agendas onto Danville. The 
NAACP branch in Danville, though operating under local leadership, was criminalized 
by city councilmembers and the Register as a negative national influence in Danville. The 
federal courts, which ruled in favor of the NAACP for desegregation in the city, were 
portrayed as a governmental force infringing on the constitutional rights of Danville’s 
citizens. City leadership then combined this language with explicit references to 
Danville’s self-important history as the temporary Confederate capitol. These messages, 
released to the public through the Register, were intended to influence the white public to 
perceive these issues in the same way as the white authority figures saw them. As the 
1963 movement began, the “outsiders” label went to those coming into Danville from 
outside the city, primarily those from the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC). Even though the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) had an 
affiliate office in Danville, the Danville Christian Progressive Association (DCPA), 
SNCC was the only national organization that sent several members to aid in the direct 





 I also attempted to create a strong connection between the national civil rights 
movement and the Danville movement. It was important to both distinguish and 
contextualize where Danville fell in the scope of the broader civil rights history and its 
more well-known events. Danville was the perfect example of a city which fell into a 
chain reaction of protests that stemmed from national events that captured the attention of 
the nation in the early 1960s. I always suspected that the sit-ins in Greensboro, North 
Carolina, inspired Danville’s youth branch of the NAACP to conduct the sit-in at the 
library just a short time later, and to have that confirmed by my sources solidified 
Danville’s position following Greensboro. Similarly in 1963, I argue the events of 
Birmingham, Alabama, affected the Danville movement in 1963 in multiple ways. Not 
only did the Birmingham march serve as the spark which finally ignited the direct protest 
movement after years of taking slow, calculated measures, but I also argue police Chief 
Eugene McCain also borrowed tactics from Birmingham police Chief Bull Connor. Many 
of the tactics utilized by Chief McCain mirror accounts printed in the Register about the 
Birmingham march, and McCain was later described as a “Bull Connor type” by Robert 
Zellner, an active SNCC member familiar with both chiefs due to his time spent in 
Danville and Birmingham.  
 This thesis draws upon current and past historiography while also serving 
to fill important gaps that continue to exist. There is no historiography on the Danville 
civil rights movement, thus I gathered inspiration from civil rights historians who have 
written about other movements and key activists from the national level and transferred 
some of these ideas to Danville. Clayborn Carson’s book In Struggle: SNCC and the 




of Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee in Danville. Carson characterized the 
first several years of the organization as the “first phase” of SNCC, and their work in 
Danville fell into this time frame. Understanding SNCC as an organization that sought 
out rural areas for direct aid that other national groups shied away from was useful in 
understanding their quick response and action in Danville, as well as how their work 
impacted the movement as a whole. John Dittmer’s work Local People: The Struggle for 
Civil Rights in Mississippi served as an example on how to write about local people in the 
civil rights movement. His book called for more research on local towns and cities during 
the civil rights narrative, for there cannot be a national narrative without the thousands of 
local stories that exist to create that national narrative. This perspective was highly 
influential as I struggled with thinking of how to contextualize Danville as an important 
local movement that held national relevance. Most importantly, books such as At the 
Dark End of the Street by Danielle McGuire and A More Beautiful and Terrible History 
by Jeanne Theoharis led me to realize that not all civil rights histories are triumphant. 
Like Danville, they are not all successful or lead to significant civil rights achievements 
for the local black community. However, these stories are just as important as 
triumphalist narratives as they create a more realistic representation of the American civil 
rights movement. 
This paper seeks to fill a significant gap that remains in civil rights historiography 
by examining the specific tactics of resistance employed by white authorities in the city 
in order to cut off the movement. The white authority structures I primarily draw upon in 
this thesis are the Danville city council, the local judicial system, and the police 




responsible for the passage of local laws and decisions. The judicial system would then 
enforce these racist laws in the court room, ensuring that a fair trial would be impossible. 
The police department enforced these laws in the streets and resorted to violent tactics to 
clear the streets of demonstrators. I frequently draw upon the commentary of the white 
men who led and worked inside these institutions, as these men represent a combined 
system of institutional racism in Danville that worked together to keep the white political 
and social interest in power. By approaching the story from this perspective, the ways in 
which these authorities figures worked together to create interlocking strategies that built 
an almost impenetrable wall of white resistance becomes clear. These institutions of 
white power in Danville initially struggled to figure out how to handle a protest, like the 
first sit-in at the library, but later adapted as they worked together diligently to cut off a 
movement seeking equal opportunities for black citizens in the city. The close 
examination of resistance tactics allows for a broader picture of the civil rights story to 
emerge, and in many ways explains the significant lack of progress that resulted from the 
Danville movement. Exploring these institutions of white resistance and how they 
responded to local movements may be the key to better understanding the successes and 
failures of the national civil rights movement.  
This thesis also explores the ways in which tactics were borrowed from national 
and local events on both sides of the civil rights movement, an examination that is 
lacking from current civil rights historiography. In the case of Danville, it is clear that 
civil rights demonstrators borrowed tactics from the larger national movement such as 
marching, singing freedom songs, and carrying signs that stated their demands. They also 




aiding other small localities in their own movements. Similarly, white authorities in 
Danville borrowed techniques of massive resistance they deemed successful from other 
cities across the South. Though there are no records in which he explicitly states he 
borrowed tactics from Birmingham, the action taken by Chief McCain during the summer 
of 1963 mirror the police response in Birmingham almost exactly. This similarity was not 
lost on the Danville protestors, as many recalled later in their lives that what happened in 
Danville was exactly like, or even worse, than what happened in Birmingham. A closer 
examination of such borrowing techniques during the civil rights has the potential to 
provide historians with a deeper understanding of the way the civil rights movement 
operated, and expose links and influences that existed between local movements even if 
they were states apart. It is local movements like Danville that fill the national narrative, 
and their connections to better-known events in civil rights history deserve to be 
examined to complete the American civil rights story.  
It is easy to look at a civil rights story like Danville’s and dismiss it as a failure. 
Nothing is inevitable, but in considering the extensive and powerful massive resistance 
that white leadership put forth in Danville, it is hard not to see the movement as doomed 
from the start. Yet, even in the face of such overwhelming obstacles, the larger Danville 
movement was able to achieve certain accomplishments. A desegregated library, 
integration of the public schools, and the hiring of a black police officer and store clerk to 
name a few. These accomplishments would serve as watershed events to successes much 
further into the future, even if those successes did not arrive until decades later. The 
reality of the national civil rights movement may look much more like Danville than it 




national attention, and thus the attention of historians, these smaller movements that 
burned quick and bright have the potential to tell us just as much about the larger civil 
rights struggle. Until more of these histories are captured, a true image of the civil rights 








“I’m sorry, we don’t serve Negroes here,” the waitress told Ezell Blair Jr. as he 
asked her for a cup of coffee. Blair and three of his friends from A&T University in 
Greensboro, North Carolina, were sitting at a Woolworth’s lunch counter downtown, an 
action they knew could be dangerous. Woolworth’s permitted black patrons to enter the 
store and eat, but they were expected to stand and eat at the end of the L- shaped counter 
rather than sitting on one of the barstools. The students sat firmly in their seats, refusing 
to stand and eat at the end of the bar. Though tensions were high in the restaurant, there 
was surprisingly little that took place after the young men claimed their seats. A 
policeman showed up, but he simply walked behind the students without saying anything. 
Reporters and photographers gathered outside as word of the young men’s sit-in spread, 
all while the students kept their seats. Blair and his comrades left shortly after closing 
time and the doors were locked behind them.2 
This sit-in, conducted on February 1st, 1960, was not the first of its kind. There 
had been other sit-ins performed by black students sporadically throughout the South 
prior to 1960, but these had brought about little change. The change that did occur was 
most effective at the local level, as there was yet to be a nation-wide cohesive 
movement.3 The sit-in at Greensboro set the city apart as it ignited the national firestorm 
that followed the action of the A&T students. It would have been impossible for the crew 
to know whether their trip to Woolworth’s would create an effect that stretched beyond 
the city limits, but it certainly did. Not only did the sit-in spark a broader, national sit-in 
 
2 Wolff, Miles. 1990. Lunch at the % & 10. Rev. and Expanded ed. Chicago: I.R. Dee. p. 1-20. 




movement throughout the southern United States, but the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) emerged from Greensboro as an organization that 
would play a crucial role in the national civil rights movement.4 
The attempt to desegregate the Woolworth’s lunch counter launched widespread 
grassroots integration efforts in the South at the start of the 1960s. The Greensboro sit-in 
and those that followed were characterized by meticulous planning, contrary to initial 
historiography which portrayed the movement as spontaneous. One of the cities directly 
influenced by the Greensboro movement was Danville, Virginia, which sits less than 
sixty miles north of Greensboro on the southern Virginia border.5 Articles filled 
Danville’s local paper, the Register, of the fallout from Greensboro.6 Shortly after, the 
student-led branch of Danville’s chapter of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) picked up the story and wanted to create a 
version of Greensboro in their own city. Under the influence of Greensboro’s events, the 
Danville group carried out the first steps of the Danville civil rights movement. It would 
have been impossible for the students to know they were igniting a movement that would 
drag on for years to come. The library sit-in was the first step in a long battle that would 
take place in court rooms and the city’s streets. Greensboro sparked a protest movement 
across countless localities in America, and that included Danville, Virginia.   
 
4
 Morgan, Iwan and Philip Davies, eds., From Sit-Ins to SNCC: The Student Civil Rights Movement in the 
1960s Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012. p. 1-23 
5 Williams, Jr., Jerry. 2020 Interview by Lauren Oakes. 
6
 “Three White Men Arrested In Store Where Negroes Are Seeking To Obtain Service,” Register. February 
6, 1960.; “Negro Demonstrations At Lunch Counters Spread To Two More Cities in Carolina,” Register, 






“The incidents were the first hints of a protest movement in this city.” 
 
-The Register, April 3rd, 1960 
 
 One month after the sit-in movements began in Greensboro, North Carolina, a 
group of Danville NAACP Youth members resolved to execute change in their city. 
Planning had begun shortly after the Woolworth sit-in, and Greensboro’s proximity to 
Danville had the town buzzing with news of the nearby protests.7 Chalmers Mebane, a 
twenty-three year-old military man who had returned to Danville to finish his high school 
degree, first collected a prospective group of students from Langston High School willing 
to execute a sit-in movement.8 An active member at the Youth NAACP meetings, 
Mebane and the other students began meeting at Loyal Baptist Church to make their 
plans.9 Two of the members included brothers Robert and Jerry Williams whose father 
was a prominent local attorney and active member in the Danville NAACP branch. After 
listening to Jerry Williams Sr.’s many dinner table discussions regarding the law, the 
brothers convinced the youth group it would be best to go a different route than 
Greensboro and target a public facility rather than a private one. The group hoped that the 
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 “Three White Men Arrested In Store Where Negroes Are Seeking To Obtain Service,”  Register. 
February 6, 1960.; “Negro Demonstrations At Lunch Counters Spread To Two More Cities in Carolina,” 
Register. February 9th, 1960; Williams, Robert A. 2004. Mapping Local Knowledge Interview by Emma 
Edmunds, Gladys Hairston, and Laurie Ripper; Williams, Jerry Jr. 2020 Interview by Lauren Oakes. 
8
 Robert A Williams, “Mapping Local Knowledge,” interview by Emma Edmunds, Gladys Hairston, and 
Laurie Ripper, August 4, 2004, http://www.vcdh.virginia.edu/cslk/danville/bio_williams.html.;Jerry 
Williams, Jr., interview by Lauren Oakes, August 21, 2020. 
9
Robert A Williams, “Mapping Local Knowledge,” interview by Emma Edmunds, Gladys Hairston, and 
Laurie Ripper, August 4, 2004, http://www.vcdh.virginia.edu/cslk/danville/bio_williams.html.; Loyal 
Baptist Church was where Reverend Doyle J Thomas presided over services. Thomas was also the leader of 




law would side with them if they attempted to desegregate a public facility rather than a 
privately owned business. They set their sights on the all-white public library.10  
 In 1960, segregation was the way of life in Danville, Virginia. Schools, public 
transportation, restaurants, recreational facilities, and entertainment venues were all 
segregated. Longtime Danville residents Jerry Williams, Carolyn Wilson, Thurmon 
Echols, and Iris Dance all made similar statements during their interviews; in Danville, 
everything was segregated. The city segregated its public library system into two 
branches, and William F. Grasty was the name of the facility that served black city 
patrons. This library was “totally inadequate” as Jerry Williams tells it, much like most of 
the city’s segregated facilities. Williams recalled that Grasty library held few of the books 
that many black children needed in order to complete their school assignments. The 
students would have to walk to Grasty to place a book request, only to have it be brought 
over from the all-white Memorial Library just a few blocks down the street.11 The 
Memorial Library contained around 35,000 volumes available to its white patrons, while 
Grasty only held 8,000 volumes, confirming Williams’ memory.12 The Memorial Library 
was located at the former Sutherlin Mansion, which held local fame as the Last Capitol of 
the Confederacy. In transforming the mansion into a library, this “showpiece” of Danville 
served as a public memorial to the Lost Cause of the Confederacy.13 The mansion, a 
prominent symbol of white pride rooted deep in the old days of the Civil War, would 
 
10 Robert Williams, “Mapping Local Knowledge,” interview by Emma Edmunds, Gladys Hairston, and 
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soon sit in the center of the debate over the library, segregation in the city, and the 
expectations of citizens in Danville by those in power – namely the all-white City 
Council.  
 
Danville’s white citizens celebrated the Sutherlin Mansion-turned-Memorial 
Library into  a monument to its Confederate past.14 Built in 1859, the mansion was home 
to the city’s tobacco tycoon William T Sutherlin, who served as a quartermaster during 
the Civil War.15 As the Union was encroaching on Richmond, Virginia, Confederate 
President Jefferson Davis fled to Danville with his cabinet and stayed at Sutherlin’s 
home. By 1960, the building had doubled as both the white library and a monument to the 
“Last Capitol of the Confederacy” for thirty years.16 The city created its first public 
library system in 1930, though it is unknown exactly why the mansion was chosen to 
serve as the city’s first library.17 A likely explanation is just how important the mansion 
and property were to the white citizens of Danville. During the fight over desegregation 
of the public library, the rhetoric from leaders like former congressman Chase Wheatley, 
councilman John Carter, and city prosecutor James Ferguson made it clear there were 
strong currents of community pride in the mansion and what it stood for: the lost cause of 
the Civil War. The city put the mansion on a pedestal of white supremacy even though 
they had lost the war, and leaders like Wheatley and Carter saw themselves as protecting 
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their southern identity by excluding African Americans from the building. The refusal to 
integrate the library seemingly represented the last stand of Danville’s Confederate cause. 
City leaders like Wheatley accused the youth group of targeting the library 
because of its Civil War history, but Jerry Williams was adamant statements like those 
were not true.18 Williams explicitly said it was not the NAACP’s decision to conduct the 
sit-in, and the library’s location in the former capitol of the Confederacy meant nothing to 
the youth group or African Americans in Danville. The group had chosen the library 
because it was a public institution, and they knew they had better chances for success at 
attempting to integrate a city-operated facility rather than a private one. Williams also 
said the white library was targeted because of how inadequate the library for black 
residents was in comparison to the white facilities. When Williams testimony is 
compared to statements like those made by Wheatley, it becomes clear the mansion 
carried more significance with the white population of the city than with its black 
citizens. More than just an affront to white order, it was evident white leadership in the 
city was insulted by the attempted integration of the library at the Sutherlin Mansion, and 
interpreted the movement to allow black patrons inside as a personal affront.  
The day of the planned sit-in, April 2nd, the group of black students marched up 
the front steps and through the doors of  the Memorial Library, shocking city librarian 
Florence Robertson. Chalmers Mebane, Robert and Jerry Williams, and approximately 13 
other students approached Ms. Robertson’s desk and asked her to issue them library 
cards. Stunned that the students would brave such a request, the librarian instructed the 
group she would not be issuing them cards because the library was closed. Despite her 
 
18




claim, the students sat down and stayed for about twenty minutes before finally exiting 
the building.19 Once they departed, city manager Edward Temple arrived to conduct “a 
full investigation” of the incident.20 After leaving the library, the youths regrouped and 
then headed to Ballou Park, another public facility only open to white residents. The 
students started playing basketball until a sudden rainstorm forced them to seek shelter 
under the pavilion. While there, a group of white teenagers in a car pulled up to the park 
and began verbally harassing the black students. Shortly after the white students’ arrival, 
city manager Temple and a few Danville city police officers arrived on scene and ordered 
all students to leave stating the park was closing. The police interrogated the black 
students regarding their presence in the park, not bothering to detain the group of white 
students who were also there. In a press statement given the next day, NAACP chapter 
president Doyle Thomas spoke for the group, stating their reasons for entering the library 
were because they needed books for a school assignment that were not available at either 
the Langston High School library or the Grasty branch. Additionally, the sit-in at the park 
was due to no comparable facility being offered for African American children in the 
city.21  
News articles released following the integration attempts portray the students as 
carrying out the will of the NAACP, yet Jerry Williams is adamant that was not the 
case.22 In the weeks following the sit-in city leaders would condemn the act as sponsored 
by the NAACP, illustrating the group as an outside organization seeking to impose its 
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will in Danville. Williams asserted that his father, NAACP lawyer Jerry Williams Sr., 
discouraged his sons from attempting to integrate because of possible dangers and legal 
costs if any of the teens were jailed. In spite of Williams Sr.’s pleas, the group remained 
steadfast in their decision to sit-in at the library. Though the NAACP was hesitant, they 
pledged their support to the students no matter the outcome.23 The desegregation attempts 
caused a frantic city council to close all public libraries in Danville until further notice, 
igniting a nasty legal battle that would engulf the city for the next six months.  
Historian Stephen Cresswell stresses the important role libraries played in 
desegregation and sit-in campaigns across the south during the 1960s civil rights 
movement in his article “The Last Days of Jim Crow in Southern Libraries.” The city of 
Danville seemed to follow the model that Cresswell outlines of other southern states 
when it came to their public library system.24 It wasn’t until around the 1920s that the 
city established its first public library, which was for whites only. The black Grasty 
branch followed sometime later, thus establishing a segregated library system around the 
1930s.25 The reign of Jim Crow in southern public libraries was short, but powerful 
nonetheless. Cresswell highlights a1961 investigation by the United States Commission 
on Civil Rights which sent out 256 surveys to libraries across the South receiving federal 
funds, and although only 109 surveys were returned, the results were illuminating. The 
survey demonstrated that white libraries were open approximately thirty-three hours per 
week, a stark contrast to the average fifteen hours a week in which the libraries for black 
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citizens operated.26 The exact operating hours of the Grasty branch in Danville are 
unknown, but considering the lack of resources and funding allotted to the black library, 
such an assumption that the hours may have differed significantly is not unreasonable. 
Additionally, the Commission also learned from the survey that white libraries averaged 
28,000 book volumes compared to 4,400 volumes housed at the library for black 
patrons.27 Given this information, the Danville percentage was a little higher than the 
survey average, but not by much. 
The sit-in movement that sparked from Greensboro triggered other sit-in protests 
across the South, many of them occurring in public libraries and fueled by the NAACP. 
Danville is close in proximity to Greensboro, the cities are less than an hour drive from 
one another. Yet, the first library sit-in in Virginia took place in Petersburg that March, 
just one month after the Woolworths sit-in. In Petersburg, unlike Danville, nearly all of 
the demonstrators were arrested by police for refusing to leave the library. However, 
similarly to the Danville sit-in which would follow one month later, Petersburg officials 
also decided the best way to solve the problem was to close the public library. The 
Petersburg sit-in was also constructed by the NAACP, though not the youth branch.28 The 
similarities between Petersburg and Danville in combination with national trends 
indicated from the results of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights survey places the 
Danville story right in the middle of a larger struggle over the fight for public libraries 
during the national civil rights movement. Like the Danville case, Cresswell writes that 
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by 1964 sit-in movements in libraries across the South were nearly over, as federal court 
judges had continued to rule in favor of black demonstrators and eliminate de jure 
segregation in public facilities.29 More importantly, the findings from Cresswell’s 
research indicate white resistance tactics in Danville followed a broader national trend, 
resisting desegregation just as fiercely as many other cities across the southern United 
States.  
Following the sit-ins, Danville City Council convened to debate an appropriate 
response to the weekend’s events. The council enacted an ordinance that declared the 
library system was currently “over-taxed by the demand of its patrons,” and, therefore, 
would not be issuing new library cards to anyone, effective immediately.30 The council 
also discussed the issue of the public parks, which the they voted unanimously would 
only be available to those residing in the park’s immediate neighborhood, meaning parks 
such as Ballou Parks were strictly limited to the white families who lived in its vicinity.31 
The following Wednesday, NAACP lawyers Ruth Harvey Wood, Jerry Williams, and 
others sued the City of Danville, city manager Temple, and librarian Robertson for black 
access to the Memorial Library.32 Though the council had voted to shut down both public 
library branches and restrict access to public parks, the NAACP chose to focus on the 
library system, which was partially funded by black taxpayer money. Their lawsuit set 
the tone for what would become months of turmoil and legal battles between the city 
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council and the NAACP for the right to obtain equal access to public facilities and 
exercise their 14th Amendment rights as United States citizens.  
Nearly a decade after the Supreme Court overturned the “separate but equal” 
doctrine with the Brown v. Board of Education decision, Danville’s white lawmakers still 
saw it as their constitutional right to prevent black citizens from enjoying the same rights 
and privileges granted to white citizens. Their fight over the library, in actuality, was a 
fight to hold on to the system of white supremacy and power, which blatantly operated in 
Danville. Refusing to face the legal realities of an end to Jim Crow and the tidal wave of 
sit-in movements throughout the U.S. South, white leadership in Danville put up a 
massive resistance to integration, portraying it as fueled by the NAACP whom they saw 
as “outside agitators” seeking to ruin the city.33 Utilizing white power rhetoric that 
portrayed Danville’s fight to hold on to the segregated library as an extension of the 
Confederate cause during the Civil War, Danville’s power players of 1960 were 
desperate to maintain an old order that was quickly slipping away. 
Federal Judge Roby Thompson heard the NAACP’s case against the city of 
Danville the following month and ordered the court to prepare an injunction ordering the 
Memorial Library to service both white and black patrons.34 Shortly after the hearing 
began, Judge Thompson asked Danville city attorney James Ferguson, “Is the City of 
Danville operating a free public library with public funds and denying citizens use 
because of race?” Purposefully denying black citizens equal access to public facilities 
was a violation of the 14th Amendment, a precedent established by the Supreme Court in 
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the Brown v. Board of Education lawsuit. Ferguson tried to argue that the city did allow 
African Americans to hold library cards at the Memorial Library under certain 
circumstances. There was in fact a small number of county educators who held cards at 
the city Memorial Library, but Ferguson’s defense fell flat when the NAACP pointed out 
that no black city residents were permitted to hold library cards at the white library. 35 It 
was overwhelmingly clear that the city did not offer library cards to the black residents 
whose tax dollars were supporting the library system. In his final defense of Danville, 
Ferguson stated, “Every citizen understands undue mixing of the races can be potentially 
explosive. That’s the one thing I’m trying to show here.”36 Despite this claim by 
Ferguson, there was no evidence in recent city history that indicated an “explosive” 
outcome would be the result of black and white citizens being together. The day the 
students had sat in at the library, the city placed a policeman at the door just in case 
violence broke out, yet nothing happened. Even at Ballou Park, when the black teens 
were harassed by white teenagers, events remained peaceful.37 Judge Thompson then 
gave the city an option: if they could assure him that black residents would be allowed 
full access to the library then he would not need to grant the injunction forcing 
integration. In spite of the olive branch offered by the judge, James Ferguson refused to 
concede his position. He retorted, “We have no authority to speak for the legislative body 
of Danville.”  
In writing his decision, one key point the judge included was that both public 
libraries were supported by the tax dollars of white and black citizens of the city. It was 
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clear that the tax dollars supporting the library system were primarily going towards the 
Memorial Library, as the whites-only branch held nearly four times as many books and 
was in the middle of an expansion at the time. Granting the injunction, Judge Thompson 
found that the black citizens of Danville had been denied access to the Memorial Library 
solely because of their race, which was a violation of the protections given to American 
citizens under the Constitution. Therefore, all black citizens in Danville must be granted 
use of the Memorial Library.38 Thompson’s decision falls in line with other civil rights 
lawsuits and court cases filed throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  
Adamant that compliance with Judge Thompson’s decision was not the proper 
solution, the council held a vote on whether or not attorney Ferguson should submit an 
appeal of Judge Thompson’s decision, and the legislative body unanimously voted to 
proceed with litigation. The council also voted in a five-to-three decision they would put 
the fate of the library’s future up to a public a referendum vote.39 Though the vote would 
not have any legal binding on the council, it was to serve as a guide for what the city 
supposedly wanted to do about the library issue. For those on the council who wanted to 
refuse integration at all costs, the vote seemed likely to go in their favor as the numbers 
of black citizens in the city registered and eligible to vote was exponentially lower than 
that of the white citizens.40  Dr. Lurton Arey, James Catlin, and Charles Womack were 
the three council members opposed to the referendum vote.41 These men did not classify 
themselves as integrationists, but they did seem to indicate more of a willingness to 
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follow federal orders than other councilmembers like John Carter. It is likely their stance 
represented a wanting of a peaceful transition into a desegregated library system, as many 
were concerned a chaotic fight would deter businesses from wanting to settle in the city 
and negatively affect the economic interests of white citizens. This concern was indicated 
by concerned citizens during town hall-style meetings later in the summer.42 If the 
councilmen had merely had a desire to follow federal order, there should have been a 
push earlier than the sit-in attempt to follow federal court decisions from the Brown v. 
Board case or an interest shown in desegregating more public facilities, like school, in the 
aftermath of the library integration. These men were not staunch segregationists like 
some of the members of city council, but that does not mean they desired an integrated 
library or that they supported black civil rights in Danville. 
  
The referendum ballot would present five options to the voters, and issue that later 
would come to complicate the vote even more. Rather than have two options, one to close 
the library to all or one to open the library to all, the five options seem to further indicate 
a city council split over what solution to come to regarding the library. The white public 
would see themselves as having a variety of options to choose from, but the referendum 
vote would not actually have any legal weight no matter the outcome. The five ballot 
options as presented to the voters were: 
1. Close the library system.  








3. Open the library to all citizens.  
4. Permit the Council to work out a “modified plan” to keep the library open. 
5. Close the library building for public use and dispense books by 
bookmobile.43 
There is significance in the various options presented to the Danville voters in regard to 
the “library issue”44. As the legislative body in Danville, the council could have decided 
to make the decision for the city and not have gone to the trouble of holding a vote. 1960 
was an election year for the council, and it is likely that many of the members saw the 
vote as a way to win favor with voters. In their staunch resistance to integration, language 
that glorified Danville as the last capitol of the Confederacy, and demonization of the 
NAACP as an outside force dictating what to do with their own city, many on the council 
sought to convince white voters that the only logical choice was to close the library rather 
than integrate. It is also likely that holding a referendum vote would serve as strong 
argument in court if there were more court battles regarding integration of public 
facilities. Regardless of the exact reason, or a combination of the  above, it was clear the 
all-white council was only vying for the white vote. Whites comprised the  overwhelming 
majority of  voters in Danville, as only 6% of eligible black citizens were registered to 
vote in Danville.45 This meant the decision of whether or not to allow black access to the 
library would be decided by a nearly entirely white electorate who were overwhelmingly 
opposed to integration. As the weeks would pass leading up to the referendum, rhetoric 
put forth by the council made it clear that the black vote was not considered important or 
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significant when it came to talks over the referendum vote or outcome of the public 
library.  
The council’s continuous meetings, voting, and public forums between the sit-in 
and the end to the library battle in September represent a governing body scrambling to 
solidify a racial order which had never been openly challenged in Danville. Even with six 
years of the federal courts supporting a national civil rights movement for African 
Americans, segregation in Danville operated as a daily function of life for both white and 
black citizens. Little to no challenges of the laws or social norms occurred prior to 1960, 
cementing the ideas of segregation and white power in the city. The sit-in at the library 
and following NAACP lawsuit forced the city council and whites in Danville to confront 
and clarify a shifting racial order that had always been assumed solid because of its 
reinforcement by local laws. This order had been shaken by not only the sit-in movement, 
but the federal court’s decision to force integration. Placing a referendum in front of 
voters would create the illusion whites in Danville had a voice in whether or not to follow 
the federal court’s orders and reinforced the idea of the white role in decision-making for 
Danville. For leaders like Carter an Wheatley, the solution to their problem was to 
proceed with a private library facility for whites without waiting for the results of the 
referendum vote, as a private facility would be out of government reach and maintain the 
black exclusionary atmosphere that already existed in the city. The decision to proceed 
with the private library before conducting the referendum vote demonstrates 
segregationists’ confidence that the public would overwhelmingly vote to keep the 




library proposal were attempts at explicitly maintaining the system of white power and 
black exclusion in Danville.  
 
Certainly to the disbelief of Carter and Wheatley, white leadership and 
community members were not all in agreement when it came to how to handle the library 
issue. The council’s decision to include five options on the referendum vote for the 
library is the first indicator of a division. In theory, the vote only asked two questions - 
whether or not the citizens of Danville desired to keep the library open to all or close it 
permanently rather than integrate. Councilman Carter vocalized this idea, and claimed 
that the inclusion of five options was too confusing for the public.46 The variety of 
options may have been an indicator of discontent among the council, and the options 
were there to appease the three members who were initially opposed to a referendum 
vote. Council members like James Catlin who seemed to favor an open library system 
would have known a private library would ultimately mean black exclusion, a move away 
from the national trend of expanding civil rights for African Americans. The black 
electorate would be voting on this referendum as well, even if their turnout would be a 
fraction of the white vote due to voter suppression in Danville. Those on the council who 
were more moderate, like James Catlin, Mozelle Fairer, and Charles Womack may have 
seen the options as a way to include black citizens in the vote. More likely, the permanent 
closure of a widely-used public resource would signal the end of a free community 
service that symbolled literacy, education, and progress. Closing the public library system 
would certainly not make Danville an attractive location for industry or growth. Even for 
 




white citizens who did not consider themselves integrationists, they realized the closure 
of the public library solely for the purpose of refusing to allow black patrons might 
negatively impact the white community in the process by removing a free resource many 
of them benefited from and risking future financial ventures in the city that could benefit 
the economy.  
A small group of white citizens expressed their discontent at the closure of the 
public library by sending a petition to the city council requesting the libraries reopen. The 
original petition contained thirty-one signatures of current Memorial Library cardholders 
or their relatives, and the group of signees committed to gathering more community 
support.47 Led by Dr. Martin Doneslon Jr., a noteworthy white citizen in Danville, his 
name along with the other signees were listed in the Register’s run of the story for all the 
public to see. The petition itself stated that the group believed the public library was 
“essential to the cultural life and to the general growth and progress of our community…” 
When Donelson was asked if the group favored integration, replied with “no comment.”48 
After a short time, the group’s petition number grew by 300 names, and the updated 
petition was sent to mayor Julian Stinson.49 The additional individuals who added their 
names to the petition were all “leading white citizens” in the city, representing a white 
body that was adamantly against the library closure.50 The group as a whole prioritized a 
functioning public library as a necessity in a growing city like Danville over their 
personal feelings towards integration. The aim of this group is important to understanding 
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the lack of uniformity among white citizens in Danville, yet also represents that whites 
with these views did not hold the majority of power in the city. Even though over 300 
white petitioners asked the council to reopen the library, their request was ignored.  
 Individuals wishing to create a private library facility formed an official body to 
govern the project. Named the Steering Committee, leaders included former House of 
Delegates representative Chase Stuart Wheatley and current councilman John Carter. 
Robert Zellner later described Wheatley’s role in the library issue as that of a “political 
boss” in Danville. Zellner portrayed Wheatley as a man jaded and bitter about his lack of 
nomination for a congressional seat following his first term and thus was searching for 
power in an effort to avoid showing further weakness.51 John Carter, the most right-wing 
member of city council, held steadfast views on maintaining segregation and keeping the 
federal government out of Danville’s affairs.52 Carter held a law degree from the 
University of Virginia and by 1960 had been on the council for two years. Wheatly and 
Carter were the most vocal public figures against integration during the debates over the 
library issue, and their leadership role in creating a private library option was not 
surprising. If anyone else on the council or in the public saw it as a conflict of interest for 
the councilman Carter to take on such a role, the Register certainly didn’t report it. At the 
first public committee meeting Wheatly gave assurance that as soon as a charter could be 
obtained, the private library would be moving ahead.53  
The difference in opinions among white citizens over the creation of a private 
library provides insights into the white citizen’s values and the reception of these ideas 
 
51 Zellner, Robert. “July, 1960” in “Approximate Chronology of the Danville Movement,” circa 1964. 
52
 “Gentle Leader Remembered,” The Register & Bee, February 11, 2004. 
53
 “Moves Made To Prevent Integrated Library: Group To Seek Foundation For Private Library,” Register, 




from those in power. Physically and financially, it would have been much easier to follow 
Judge Thompson’s orders and open the public libraries to any patron regardless of race. 
The creation of a private library would require a new facility, new books, money to pay 
salaries, and more. This money would all have to be comprised of private donations or 
fees, and was set to cost thousands of dollars. None of that money, even if privately 
sourced, would be necessary if the city council had chosen to comply with Judge 
Thompson’s orders. There was also significant white support in the community for the 
continued functioning of a public library despite the integration that would come with it. 
This illustrates that powerful and influential white leadership in Danville was not 
concerned with a practical approach to the library issue or the voices of leading white 
citizens who held opinions contrary to their own. Councilman Carter’s position on both 
the council and Steering Committee further supports the idea that Danville’s white 
leadership was desperate to hold on to their positions of status and power and 
demonstrated a refusal to compromise at all with black equality in the city. Power and 
control was at stake, and white leadership like John Carter were desperate to hold on to 
all they could as any compromise with black citizens or the federal government would 
take away from the complete social and political control white citizens in Danville had 
enjoyed for their entire lives. Even a small amount of black social or political power that 
may arise from the defeat over the library segregation would bring a tremendous loss to 
white power in the city. 
 
An open forum was held for city council candidates shortly after the counsel 




people heard the prospective councilmen (and one councilwoman) talk on a variety of 
issues, but the issue that dominated the night was the public library.54 It was during this 
public forum that fear over federal intervention and forced “race mixing” became clear as 
the candidates boldly declared their feelings regarding the federal integration order and 
the closure of the public library. W. McCubbins stated that he was “absolutely opposed to 
mixing of the races in any way, shape, or form.” Supposedly meaning no disrespect to his 
“colored friends”, McCubbins declared it was not the African American community he 
was fighting, but rather the NAACP “which gives orders from New York.”55 In 
portraying the NAACP as a northern outside organization attempting to dictate how the 
small southern city of Danville should operate, rather than the local advocacy group it 
really was, McCubbins’ statements mirrored the ideas expressed by Carter and Wheatly. 
Councilman hopeful Fletcher Harris also echoed these sentiments, claiming his issue was 
with federal overreach and a violation of white citizen’s constitutional rights. Harris 
stated, “I am opposed to the acceptance of federal doctrines which are in conflict with the 
Constitution of the United States…I believe in the rights of the minority, but the rule of 
the majority…It is my opinion that the majority of the citizens of Danville would prefer 
to see the library and parks closed rather than integrated…”56  
If Harris truly believed in the legal rights of the minority, then he should have had 
no issue understanding the constitutionality of Judge Thompson’s integration order, 
which had clearly been influenced by the Brown v. Board decision. Additionally, Harris’ 
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statements regarding the “rule of the majority” only consider the supposed interest of the 
white citizens of Danville. While it is true that Danville’s racial demographic was 
majority white, blacks in the city constituted more than 30% percent of the city’s 47,000 
residents.57 The insinuation of Harris’ entire statement is that the rule of the majority was 
inherently what should be considered “constitutional,” even if those ideas did not actually 
follow federal interpretation of the United States Constitution. What Harris and other 
candidates supported was actually a denial of constitutional rights for the African 
American citizens of Danville, but their segregationist rhetoric was an attempt to appeal 
to white voters in the city with language that appeared to be common sense.  If the 
Constitution supported majority rule, then why should white citizens, who comprised a 
majority in Danville (albeit a slim one) be expected to give up their rights in order to give 
more rights to black citizens? Harris’ arguments were meant to appeal to a sense of anger 
and denial within white voters to motivate them to go to the polls and vote for him and 
councilman while also voting against any form of library integration. 
At the same public forum, several white citizens expressed concern that the 
closure of the public library would be a deterrent for new industry in the city, therefore 
minimizing Danville’s growth and economic potential. When taking questions from the 
public about Danville’s future, Dr. Ralph Landes asked, “If libraries, parks, and schools 
were closed, how would we get new industry?”58 Catlin and Harris both responded that 
the question of schools was not an issue in the current campaign and a bit “premature,” as 
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it was the issue of libraries and parks at stake.59 Landes’ question was actually  quite 
relevant to the current issue, rather than “premature” as Catlin and Harris deemed it. 
Prince William County Schools in Virginia had closed rather than integrate only about a 
year prior, and potential school closures along with the libraries seemed a natural 
concern. Citizens in Danville would have heard all about Prince William’s closure, and it 
would seem to follow that if the library closed to avoid integration this might apply to a 
federally ordered school integration as well. 
Candidate Barker responded to Dr. Landes’ question by commenting, “I believe 
we had industry  before we had a library.”60 Even though current councilmen and those 
running for the position seemed unconcerned about the negative impacts that the closure 
of the library might have on industry in the city, a change of heart came quickly. The 
story of Danville’s library closure and eventual reopening in its vertical-integration style 
made the city a national embarrassment, and leadership in Danville was condemned by 
Time, The New York Times, the American Library Association, and the Wilson Library 
Bulletin.61 Richard Bourne, a professor the University of Baltimore who grew up in 
Danville wrote in an essay years later that the pressure of the library issue potentially 
hindering industry in the city was eventually what led city leadership to backdown, 
claiming that businesses did not want “to move to the backwater Danville would 
become” if they continued closures of public facilities for the sake of segregation.62 
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Robert Zellner, a field secretary for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, 
claimed that it was the threat of industry removal, not the federal judge’s orders, which 
eventually motivated the council to reopen the public library on an integrated basis.63 
Another obstacle that made white citizens hesitant about a private library were the 
costs of such a project. In June a public letter was published in the Register that 
condemned the idea of a private library for many reasons, but a key reason being the cost. 
The anonymous author wrote that the current public library was valued at more than 
500,000 dollars, and cost 74,000 dollars a year to operate. Councilman Carter took 
exception to this statement, calling it “irresponsible.”64 Carter claimed that the author of 
the letter was overstating the amount it costs to run the library, and that in reality it would 
only cost about half of what the city was currently spending on the library. He also 
pointed out that the current operational cost of the public system included supporting a 
book mobile and the Grasty branch, neither of which would be operated with the 
proposed private facility for whites. Carter vocalized that funds for the library would be 
provided through private donors and fees for holding a library card.65 He also proposed 
the way to fill the private library with books would be to simply purchase them from the 
city’s library, which he expected to remain closed.66 Thus, Carter’s plan was to fill the 
new private library with the books from the former libraries which had been purchased 
with the taxpayer money of both black and white citizens. Carter’s seeming entitlement to 
the city’s resources demonstrates a complete disregard for the black community in 
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Danville. Not only did he feel they did not deserve access to public educational facilities 
in the same way white citizens did, he found it totally acceptable to take the books that 
had been purchased with black taxpayer money for his own white library. Carter’s push 
for a private facility also demonstrates an attempt to go beyond federal government reach, 
believing that the government could not mandate a privately funded facility to uphold 
black citizen’s 14th Amendment rights.  
In the same letter, the presumed white author also takes issue with the five options 
that would be presented to the voters in the coming weeks, stating that the question is 
merely, “Do you or do you not, desire a library in Danville?”67 Wheatly, who “sharply” 
took issue with the simplification of the library question, stated the real question was 
whether or not the city of Danville would conced to the NAACP. He also stated, “…it 
must be the question of whether you approve of integration or segregation.” Wheatley 
continues, “If a person says he is for segregation, yet, because he is unwilling to disturb 
his comfort or undergo some inconvenience, trouble, and sacrifice, he permits the things 
to happen that bring about integration. He is giving only lip service to segregation and 
might as well just say he is for integration.”68 Wheatley’s quote enlightens the true intent 
behind the creation of a private library and a forceful fight against the federal 
government. As much as the leading segregationists in the city wanted to claim the fight 
over the library was about not conceding to the NAACP or advocating for their 
constitutional rights, the reality of the situation was simple: white leadership in Danville 
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could not grasp a future in which they would have to intertwine their lives publicly with 
people of color. 
The Danville Library Foundation held its own public meeting following the city 
council’s public forum. The crowd of about 200 people once again heard arguments to 
demand their “constitutional rights” and refusal to surrender to the NAACP when it came 
to desegregating the public library. The meeting was predominately led by Wheatley and 
councilman Carter, and both heavily emphasized there should be absolutely no 
compromise with the NAACP whatsoever. 69 
“You cannot appease the NAACP,” Carter said. “If we comprise this thing, we will have 
to face it again…” Carter, though steadfast in his fight to hang on to white power in the 
city, knew the reality of the situation the Danville city government was facing. Cities 
across the South had been facing federal integration orders for years by 1960, and it is 
likely Carter knew that his best bet for holding the city was to continue to resist federal 
integration measures. Once one public facility was forced to integrate, it likely wouldn’t 
be long before more followed. Carter continued his beratement of the NAACP by 
claiming the “militant group” had only come to the city of Danville to bring “strife, racial 
trouble, distrust, and hate,” ignoring the groups obvious local ties and leadership.70 Carter 
also rebutted Judge Thompson’s argument that black citizens paid taxes and were 
therefore entitled to the library by stating that even though blacks constituted around 44 
percent of the population, whites paid 95 percent of the taxes. In portraying an image 
where whites in the city “generously and unbegrudgingly” carried the financial burden of 
non-tax paying blacks, Carter insisted white leadership in the city had “provided equal 
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facilities, and in some cases superior” ones for African Americans.71 Even if it was true 
that whites paid 95 percent of the city’s taxes, it was likely because African Americans in 
Danville were not able to hold more than menial jobs, and thus brought in a significantly 
lower income than white families.72 Carter’s arguments continued to build on this 
segregationist rhetoric as he sought to have white voters in Danville buy in to the 
argument that they were the ones carrying the black community on their backs, and 
therefore owed them nothing. Carter continuously resounded the message that whites in 
Danville would pay the price for black equality if they gave up on the fight to maintain 
their power in the city. Any compromise with the black citizens, NAACP demands, or 
federal government would lead to the downfall of white social and political power in the 
city. This downfall would affect men like Carter the most, and it would be impossible for 
him to maintain his position if white voters were not supporting him.  
 The mid-June city council election brought in more than 6,000 voters, with 4,427 
people casting a vote for one of the five options listed on the referendum. As expected, 
the majority of those votes, 2,829, were cast for the referendum options that would lead 
to a permanent closure of the public library system.73 The day following the elections the 
front page of the newspaper contained the headlines, “Citizens Would Close Library 
Rather Than Integrate: Voters Pick Catlin, McCubbins, Anderson, Harris, and Daniels.” 
The first two lines of the left column of the article immediately reiterated the title, stating, 
“Danville voters Tuesday refused to surrender the Last Capitol of the Confederacy to the 
NAACP. By a vote of 2,829 to 1,598, local citizens voted to close the public library 
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system outright rather than integrate it.”74 Councilman Carter was quick to release a 
statement immediately after the vote count had been announced. Again touting claims 
about constitutional rights, Carter stated, “I am pleased the people of the City of Danville 
will not compromise their constitutional rights with the NAACP.”75 
Drawing once again on language that elevated Danville’s “legacy” as the last 
capitol of the Confederacy, the Register’s celebratory tone declared victory over the 
NAACP which had already been established as an outsider force. Prior to the referendum 
and newspaper article, leaders in the fight to maintain segregation had been vocal in their 
disdain for the NAACP and drawn on rhetoric that glorified Danville’s position during 
the civil war in order to empower whites who still believed in Danville’s white 
supremacist legacy and to wage war against those who sought to integrate the public 
library. Without explicitly stating such either in the paper or by the city’s leading 
segregationists, if the Sutherlin Mansion represented Danville’s glory days of the Civil 
War, then the NAACP represented the northern forces who overtook the South, a sore 
spot for post-Civil War states who were forced to give up their lifestyle of slave 
ownership. Indicative in the newspaper writings and declarations of Wheatley and 
Councilman Carter, it is almost as if there is Confederate redemption in the closure of the 
libraries. Danville was forced to surrender to the Union at the end of the Civil War, but 
their refusal to comply with the federal government’s orders of integration was a victory 
in their eyes.  
In addition to the referendum vote, the new city council was decided in the June 
14th election as well. The results of the council vote brought in three new members, 
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George Anderson, Fletcher Harris, and George Daniels, with sitting members Catlin and 
McCubbins reelected to their seats.76 Interestingly enough, vocal supporter of a public 
library James Catlin received the highest amount of votes for city council members. 
McCubbins, one of the most outspoken candidates against a public library if it meant 
integration, received the second highest vote count.77 The new council was scheduled to 
convene in  September 1st, yet even with the results of the referendum vote and a new 
council body looming shortly ahead, the library issue would remain a hot debate amongst 
the council members for weeks to come. 
 
 On September 13th, the debate over the library issue in Danville came to a quick 
close. The new city council elected to re-open the public libraries in a 5-4 vote.78 The 
decision was a shock after months of meetings, bitter debates, and all the hype over the 
referendum vote in June. There was a catch to the facilities’ reopening though; the library 
would not have any chairs. In a move of “vertical integration”, library patrons would only 
have the option to stand if they decided to conduct research at the library or check out a 
book.79 This was an effort to prevent black and white patrons from sitting amongst one 
another or sharing the same space for too long, something that would be one more clear 
affront to segregated order in Danville. Councilman John Carter was livid about the 
decision. Not only was the decision an offense to the majority of citizens who had voted 
to close the libraries in the referendum vote (although everyone knew it was not legally 
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binding) was second only to his offense that black citizens had gained access to the 
sacred ground of the Confederate memorial building. In reference to the Sutherlin 
Mansion, Carter stated, “ It’s a memorial to the brave men in grey who died in the second 
war of independence that the constitutional right of local self-government might prevail.” 
A compromise with the Federal government, he continued, “will not, I think, set well 
with the people.” Regardless of Carter’s complaints and the objections of 
councilmembers Anderson, McCubbins, and Harris, the day after the council vote U.S. 
Wester District Court Judge Ted Dalton ordered the Danville public libraries to reopen to 
all, on an integrated basis, the following day.80 
 The bitter debate over the integration of the public libraries was the first of its 
kind that Danville had ever experienced. The chaos and conflict were something the city 
and its white leadership had never had to face before, as segregated order had never been 
challenged in such a blatant and intense way. In the end, these first-time problems that 
city council attempted to reconcile with the legality of segregation, hiding away through 
private avenues, or letting the people decide in the name of democracy were to no avail. 
It was a victory for black citizens and the NAACP to be sure, but a small one when 
compared to the vast amount that remained unchanged in Danville immediately following 
the library integration. Schools, restaurants, and essentially all other aspects of public and 
private life remained segregated for the next two years. Between 1961 to 1962, small 
changes would take place in Danville, but nothing would compare to the firestorm that 
was coming in the summer of 1963. Black civil rights activists were preparing to take on 
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a new means of demanding their rights, but this time institutions of white power would be 





The Years Between, 1961-1963 
 
 
 Civil rights efforts in Danville in the years following the library desegregation 
slowed, yet never fully came to a halt. The NAACP and black citizenry of Danville had 
been granted a significant legal win in regards to their demands of city leadership, and it 
was anticipated that the library would only be the first step towards a fully integrated city. 
A new city council was seated in the municipal building during the 1960 election, not 
realizing in two short years the battle that would arise in Danville would bring a violence 
and intensity far beyond that which the fight over the library had stirred up. The 
integration of the public library and the city’s tactics of “vertical integration” 
characterized the final chapter of 1960, but Danville’s civil rights story was only 
beginning.  
 Events in Danville continued to intersect with and be influenced by the larger, 
national civil rights movement. On May 7th, 1961, the Freedom Riders came through 
Danville after embarking south on their campaign trail.81 Organized by James Farmer, 
national director of the Core For Racial Equality (CORE), a mixed group of white and 
black activists trained in Washington D.C. for a few days before loading themselves onto 
a bus and planning to drive throughout the South to put segregation to the test. The 
Supreme Court had recently handed down a ruling for Boynton v. Virginia decreeing 
segregated lunch counters, bathrooms, and waiting rooms were unconstitutional. The 
Freedom Riders had set out to see for themselves if this ruling had any real affect in cities 
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across the South, and they planned to challenge any facility they saw resisting the court 
order.82 Danville was the last Virginia city to be visited by the group after departing from 
Richmond. A week after their stop in Danville the group headed to Birmingham, 
Alabama, when member of the Ku Klux Klan threw a fire bomb into the bus and attacked 
riders as they exited.83 Although the stop by the Freedom Riders does not appear to have 
caused any initial outburst in the city, their visit to Danville marks a historical cross-
section where Danville’s civil rights story interacts with that of the national movement’s 
timeline.  
 In addition to the role that Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee would 
come to play in the Danville civil rights movement, other national organizations saw the 
city as a beneficial place to set up operations. Led by Martin Luther King Jr., the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) also decided Danville was an ideal 
location to establish an official partnership. The Danville Progressive Christian 
Association (DCPA) became an official affiliate of the SCLC in 1962 under the 
leadership of a group of local church leaders. Reverend Lawrence Campbell, Reverend 
Wendell Chase, A.I. Dunlap, and Julius Adams joined together to activate the 
organization, and they collectively decided Reverend Chase would be the right man to 
serve as president of the organization.84 The close partnership between the SCLC and 
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DCPA would lead to three visits to Danville by Martin Luther King Jr. in the following 
year, all of which helped ignite and sustain the local protest movement. 
 Civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr., made his way to Danville in late March 
after visiting several other small Virginia cities and delivered a speech at the city 
auditorium to the estimated 2,500 people in attendance. He spoke of freedom for black 
citizens in Danville, boldly declaring that justice would “flow over Danville like a stream 
from mighty waters.”85 Once he concluded his speech and headed outside, an angry white 
mob was waiting for him out on the street. King was rushed to his car and driven to his 
hotel an hour away in Greensboro, North Carolina, where he had been forced to stay 
since none of the city hotels would allow him to book a room. After returning to his hotel 
room once leaving Danville, Reverend Lawrence Campbell recalled that King had a gash 
in his side where a woman had tried to stab him as he left the auditorium that day.86 This 
visit by King would only be his first of three in 1963, and though it did not directly stir 
protestors in Danville to action, his visit certainly fits into the chronology of events that 
took place in building momentum for the Danville movement which would spark in the 
late spring of 1963.  
 The final event that occurred leading up to the Danville protest movement was the 
Children’s March in Birmingham. On May 2nd, thousands of black schoolchildren and 
left their classrooms to flood Kelly Ingram Park in an effort to protest ongoing 
segregation and discrimination in Alabama. They were joined by bystanders and other 
 
85
 southernspaces, Television News and the Civil Rights Struggle: The Views in Virginia and Mississippi: 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., 2015, https://vimeo.com/131577386. 
86






protestors as the days went on, gathering momentum that would propel the event onto the 
national stage. The children and protestors were met with intense police violence, 
beatings, dog attacks and arrests.87 The Birmingham story made headlines across 
America, the front page of the Danville Register included. “Nearly 800 Negroes Jailed in 
Birmingham” was written boldly across the paper on May 3rd, and the article went on for 
several pages describing the group of young protestors in Birmingham anxious to go to 
jail for the civil rights cause. The article also included details of police action, such as the 
police arresting demonstrators for parading without a permit, and the usage of fire hoses 
and police dogs.  
The significance of the Birmingham civil rights story to that of Danville is 
twofold. First, the Birmingham movement directly influenced civil rights leadership in 
Danville to spark their own civil rights protest. Even though civil rights action was being 
taken by black city leadership, such as an omnibus segregation suit in 1962 and the visit 
by Martin Luther King Jr. in March 1963, it did not appear that a protest movement was 
imminent. The events of Birmingham and their heavy reporting by the Register are what 
ignited the city’s first direct action protests. Secondly, actions by the Danville Police 
Department closely mirrored the tactics taken on by the Birmingham Police Department, 
specifically tactics that were widely publicized in the local paper. The Danville police 
chief, Chief McCain, was even characterized as a “Bull Connor type” by one of the 
SNCC activists that came to Danville that summer to aid in organization of the 
movement.88 It is unlikely that Chief McCain came up with such tactics of massive 
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resistance and violence on his own, but rather procured the ideas from Chief Bull 
Connor’s handling of the Birmingham situation. When Danville police began mass 
arrests of protestors, they too arrested people for the violation of parading without a 
permit, and utilized the local fire department and police dogs as a form of crowd control. 
The similarities are too great to be explained by mere coincidence: usage of these 








“The chief beat me; while many others had concussions. One woman’s breast burst open 
and the demonstrators were beaten by white, deputized garbage collectors, state troopers, 
and the Danville Police…demonstrators were hosed down to the ground and washed 
away like trash.” 
 
-Gloria Campbell, demonstrator, SCLC activist, and wife of Reverend Campbell recalling 
the night of Bloody Monday, June 10th, 1963. 
 
 The 1960 fight for the public library was a battle fought mostly behind closed 
doors between the all-white city council and NAACP leadership. Though the public was 
highly aware, and even participated in the referendum vote, no public demonstrations 
took place outside of the original sit-ins on April 3rd. As sit-ins and protests movements 
swept through the South in the early 1960s, Danville’s civil rights fight continued to take 
place in distant courtrooms. Though there was incremental change occurring in Danville 
it was slow, and easily ignored by white city leadership. In the two years since the library 
fight, segregation in Danville remained firm. Entering into 1963, black individuals were 
still barred from white-owned restaurants and private businesses, and there were no black 
retail associates, firemen, police officers, city councilmen, or other public officials in the 
city.89  
In the late spring of 1963, the Children’s March in Birmingham, Alabama, 
sparked a new phase of the Danville civil rights story, and an inspired Danville Christian 
Progressive Association began planning public protest marches in the downtown area. 
The now public movement during the hot summer of 1963 would cause Danville’s white 
power structures to adapt quickly in order to confront and diminish the perceived threat 
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that was suddenly right in front of them. Hanging on to segregation in a court room was 
one thing, but managing hundreds of people marching downtown to demand equal rights 
was completely different. In order to create a wall of powerful white resistance, the 
Danville city administration, police department, and city judge all joined together to 
construct a barrier to the city’s civil rights movement that was so overwhelming it was 
nearly impossible to overcome.  
 
Daily reporting in the Register captured the brutality of the events in Birmingham. 
Police dogs attacked young children and teens in the local park and police chief Bull 
Connor ordered the fire department to spray down protesters with powerful fire hoses that 
pushed them against buildings and washed them down the street.90 However, despite 
these brutal events, the paper continued to praise what it considered an appropriate and 
measured response by the city’s law enforcement. “Nearly 800 Negroes Jailed In 
Birmingham” read the headlines of the Register the morning after the first demonstration. 
“Pupils Skip Classes To State March In Renewed Racial Demonstrations” was the 
subtitle, immediately identifying that most of those arrested were indeed underage 
schoolchildren.91 The lengthy article states on the front page that “there was no violence”, 
yet the pages that follow describe the usage of water hoses and marchers being bitten by 
police dogs. Rather than declare these events as violent, which it was, the paper wrote 
that the police merely “obliged” the protestors after their reported chants of “Bring on the 
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water. Bring on the dogs.”92 The Register’s classification of the police response in 
Birmingham as an appropriate measure are indicative of a white public perception in 
Danville that supported a certain amount of police brutality as an acceptable means of 
crowd control when dealing with civil rights protestors. These same ideas would manifest 
about Danville later in the summer, when police became increasingly violent towards 
demonstrators in the downtown area.  
 The stories of both Birmingham and Danville are similar in many ways, and the 
tactics employed by both civil rights protestors and the police closely resembled one 
another. There are a few likely explanations for this. First, at the time of the Birmingham 
march, Danville had yet to experience a city-wide protest movement like the one that 
would follow the Children’s Crusade. Until the late spring of 1963, city leadership had 
only faced their battles in a courtroom. The outcome of discrimination lawsuits filed by 
the NAACP brought about the desegregation of certain public facilities, such as parks, 
the library system, and city transportation.93 The direct protest action which would begin 
in Danville at the end of May was the first time Danville city police and city council were 
faced with the physical bodies of hundreds of black citizens who were through with 
tolerating the city’s racist practices. Once faced with such a large-scale protest, the 
actions taken by the DPD and city council mirrored the events that took place in 
Birmingham during the Children’s March and were reported in the Register. Just like 
Birmingham, protestors were arrested on charges of parading without a permit, parents 
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were arrested for their demonstrating juveniles, and the police chief brought in the local 
fire department to hose down demonstrators when they refused to clear the scene.94 Due 
to the national fame of Birmingham and the reporting of events in the local paper, is 
highly likely that the police chief in Danville garnered his knowledge of Birmingham 
police tactics from these newspaper reports and utilized them in Danville. 
Another similarity is found in the leaders of the police departments of both 
Danville and Birmingham. In Birmingham, police chief Theophilus Eugene Connor 
earned his fame as an obstinate man with no interest in serving the black citizens of the 
city in the same way he served those who were white. Born in 1897, he moved to 
Birmingham from Selma in 1922. Prior to his reputation of police brutality, Connor was 
known as an unwavering opponent of labor unions in Birmingham’s industries.95 An hard 
and unsympathetic man, he became known as Bull Connor. In Danville, police chief 
Eugene McCain has been described by many in the decades that followed his tenure as 
one who was a “Bull Connor figure,” and resembled the Birmingham police chief in both 
thought and action.96 Considering Chief McCain took a similar approach to the Danville 
protestors as Bull Connor did to those in Birmingham, commentary such as this does not 
seem far off. There is not much known about McCain’s personal life, but through his 
preferred tactics, a picture of a man who thought similarly to Birmingham’s police chief 
emerges.  Whether Chief McCain was a hardened man like Bull Connor, or simply 
wished to mimic his tactics for a variety of potential reasons, the steps Chief McCain 
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took during the movement closely mirror those from Birmingham, and demonstrate an 
exercise of white power through violence during the Danville civil rights movement.  
These similarities between Birmingham and Danville are important for 
contextualizing the city of Danville and where it fits in the larger civil rights narrative. 
Though there had been work put in to further civil rights efforts in Danville, an actual 
civil rights movement in the southern Virginia city was by no means inevitable. The quiet 
happenings through 1961 and 1962 gave the appearance that change was taking on a 
slower pace, thus the broader protest movement that occurred in 1963 was an unexpected 
shock to the city and its leadership. A close examination of the rhetoric taken on by the 
Register after the Birmingham movement lends insights into the ways in which the white 
public and leadership would treat their own civil rights protestors. The contempt at the 
display for equal rights not only shocked white power structures in Danville, but enraged 
them.97 
 
After two years of taking small steps towards racial progress in Danville and 
garnering inspiration from the events in Birmingham, the Danville Christian Progressive 
Association (DCPA) planned the first direct protest march in Danville. The first 
demonstration was held on May 31st and led by DCPA leader Reverend Alexander 
Dunlap, who was the Reverend at the Saint Paul African Methodist Episcopal Church.98 
There is little evidence of the first several days of the protest, as the local media and 
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leadership largely ignored it.99 What can be gathered, however, is that there were around 
250 black citizens in attendance, many of them young adults and high school 
teenagers.100 The marches took place in the downtown area, and demonstrators would 
leave from High Street Baptist Church and march in columns, chanting and singing, until 
they reached the large stone steps of the municipal building. Once there, they would 
climb the steps and begin singing songs of freedom and equality, two things they 
desperately wanted white city leadership to give them.101  
The municipal building on Patton Street holds many of the same offices today as 
it did in 1963. The building houses the city manager’s office, clerk’s office, and other 
offices for city administration. This building was the target spot of most of the protests 
that summer, not only because it was the location of the city’s administrative offices, but 
it was also connected by a concrete courtyard to both the city courthouse, police station, 
and jail. The combination of these buildings created a hub of activity for the summer-
long protests. Marchers would head to Patton Street to demand time with the mayor and 
city manager, protest the mass arrests of their comrades at the jail, and later attend their 
court hearings all at the same central location. Some of the most iconic pictures of 
protestors from that summer show groups of demonstrators piled along the municipal 
building steps and protesting in front of the court house, taking advantage of the elevated 
surface to put on a show of singing and clapping. Just to the right across the concrete 
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courtyard sits the courthouse, and a Latin phrase dedicated to justice is carved in stone 
above the doorway. A pathway between the courthouse and municipal building leads 
directly behind the courthouse to the city jail, a trifecta that served the police department 
just as well as it served the civil rights marchers. Protesters could easily be dragged from 
the steps of the municipal building, booked into a jail cell, and pulled later for their court 
dates all within the same city complex.  
 
The first demonstration of the protest movement in Danville occurred on May 
31th, 1963. Reverend Alexander Dunlap let a group of about 250 demonstrators to go 
marching in downtown Danville.102 Accounts of the first days of the movement are 
difficult to find, and what does exist is lacking in detail. However, first-hand accounts of 
the movement throughout the summer are largely consistent as far as the tactics and 
methods used by the protestors as they began the city’s first-ever direct protest civil rights 
movement. Groups would congregate either at High Street Baptist Church or Bible Way 
Church in the city and use them as a base to organize before marching downtown. 
Reverend Chase and Reverend Campbell served these two churches, respectively, and 
were key leaders during the Danville movement. High Street Baptist sits atop a hill in the 
downtown area, with clear views of the Dan River to the left and the downtown business 
section directly in front. It is a short walk from the church’s doors to the city municipal 
building. Bible Way is still in the city, though quite a bit further away. Demonstrators 
would still march to and from Bible Way, or run there for cover to avoid police brutality 
and arrests, but from all accounts it seems High Street was the most utilized. 
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Demonstrators would march in straight columns, carry signs, and chant and sing songs of 
freedom as they marched to the downtown city hall steps. Once there, they would crowd 
the steps and continue their chanting and singing, an event which quickly gained the 
attention of the public, police, and city officials.103  
The first several days of the protest passed peacefully; there were no arrests and 
no violence. City officials considered the marching a nuisance to downtown life that 
disrupted the flow of traffic.104 The lack of arrests in those first days of protests are 
significant. The police did not make any arrests because the protestors were not breaking 
any laws. Marching, singing, clapping, and standing on the city hall steps was not a 
crime. More so, the demonstrators right to peacefully assemble and protest their 
complaints were protected by the United States Constitution. When arrests did start, 
slowly at first and then greatly increasing in number as the movement gained momentum, 
it was because white local authorities used their powers to create new laws specifically 
targeted at demonstrators’ actions. Nothing about the protestor’s methods changed, yet 
they began facing mass arrests as authorities intentionally created laws to criminalize 
protestor’s actions. These laws took the form of an injunction issued by Judge Aiken and 
a law requiring a permit to “parade” downtown passed by city council which never even 
officially made it into Danville’s law books.  
 Danville Corporation Court Judge Archibald Aiken exercised a substantial 
amount of authority in the city. He was infamous for the pistol he wore on his hip in the 
courtroom as he handed the convicted defendants their sentences. Aiken later tried to 
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deny that he had ever worn the pistol while serving on the bench, but Chief McCain 
openly admitted to the Register he had recommended to Judge Aiken that he carry one on 
him at all times because of the “tenseness of the situation.”105 Thus, Judge Aiken had the 
reputation for being intimidating in the courtroom and very friendly with the chief of 
police. On June 6th, after a full week of protesting without any sign of easing up, Judge 
Aiken issued an injunction attempting to ban all further demonstrations, effective 
immediately, and also called for the formation of a special grand jury to investigate 
“racial disturbances” in the city.106 The injunction, which would be reinforced throughout 
the summer and upheld as lawful in federal court later on, criminalized unlawful 
assembly in the streets or public buildings of Danville, unlawful interference with the 
enterprises of private businesses, and “unauthorized gatherings and loud, boisterous and 
concerted demonstrations interfering with the peace and quiet enjoyment of the citizens 
of the City of Danville.”107 This injunction would make it impossible for any 
demonstrations to be carried out without violating Aiken’s orders, thus insuring the mass 
arrests of protestors downtown. The special grand jury was also called to examine the 
possibility to bring charges against those arrested in violation of State Statute 18.1-422.108 
This statute, otherwise known as John Brown’s law, was adopted by the Virginia 
legislature after John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry in 1859. This original statute stated 
that individuals could be charged with inciting the black population to acts of war against 
whites. After the abolition of slavery in 1865, Virginia adapted the wording of this statute 
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to keep the intent of the law, yet have the appearance it was no longer targeted towards 
African Americans. The new revised version of State Statute 18.1-422 included charges 
that could be brought against members of the white or black race who incited acts of 
violence against one another.109 Aiken’s special grand jury shortly decided to indict the 
demonstration’s leaders and participants under this John Brown Statute.110 
 Aiken’s injunction and grand jury indictments under a pre-civil war slave law 
were only one of the legal avenues white authorities took to resist the ongoing movement 
by criminalizing its participants. As the movement progressed in July, city leadership 
grappled for additional ways to hinder the protest movement. Thus, on July 10th city 
council amended the city’s parading ordinance already in existence to do the exact same 
thing Aiken’s injunction had done: limit the demonstrations by criminalizing protestor 
action and carrying out mass arrests for violation of the law. After the ordinance change, 
Chief McCain was the only one who had the authority to accept or deny parade permits, 
assuring that even if the demonstrators did go through the proper channels they certainly 
would have been denied.111 The changes to the ordinance were never legally published, 
nor published in the newspaper where the changes might be widely circulated for public 
knowledge.112 Thus, it would be impossible for protestors to follow the law even if they 
had been aware of their legal rights. The laws they were breaking that led to their arrests 
did not even exists until they began demonstrating in the streets.  
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Realizing they needed additional resources to keep up the movement, the 
Reverend Campbell and the DCPA called the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee in Atlanta on June 8th, and several SNCC members arrived in 
Danville the next day.113 Campbell never wrote in his book what exactly led him to call 
on SNCC, but with the presence of the SCLC, DCPA, and NAACP already in Danville it 
is likely he sought them out as an additional resource with experience and money that 
could bring reinforcements. It is unknown when exactly all SNCC members arrived, but 
within a few days there were fifteen representatives including Avon Rollins, Bernice 
Reagon, Cordell Reagon, Robert (Bob) Zellner, Dorothy Zellner, and photographer 
Danny Lyon.114 By 1963, SNCC was operating two unofficial sectors in its organization: 
one that was focused on voter registration and one focused on direct protest action. 
Community leaders could call SNCC when they request additional resources and would 
receive help from SNCC members specializing in direct action tactics. It was members of 
this group that SNCC sent to aid the Danville protestors.  
SNCC’s stay in Danville only lasted about ten days, yet the organization had a 
significant impact on the local protest movement.115 SNCC brought tactical training, 
resources, and publicity to Danville. In training sessions held at High Street Baptist 
Church, just a few blocks from the municipal building downtown, SNCC field workers 
taught young protestors the strategies they would need in order to make it through the 
mass arrests that would follow in the coming weeks.116 Demonstrators were instructed to 
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go limp when arrested, a tactic that infuriated police.117 Police captain Juby Towler later 
claimed that demonstrators were also taught how to fall down, grimace, and scrape their 
face on the pavement to appear as though they had been beaten by police, but there is no 
evidence to indicate this was ever taught or exhibited by the Danville protestors.118 SNCC 
photographer Danny Lyon snapped pictures of the movement that were dispersed 
throughout SNCC’s national offices, and Dorothy Zellner wrote a pamphlet that was 
published by the organization’s national office and sent to other SNCC offices across the 
country highlighting the particularly bad violence in Danville.119 Zellner later stated in an 
interview that, out of all the localities she traveled to during her years with SNCC, 
Danville was by far the worst she ever saw and experienced when it came to outright 
violence and police brutality.120 
White authorities in Danville took quick action shortly after the protesting began 
in order to prevent the movement from gaining further momentum. The city court system, 
city administration, and police force worked together to create a wall of white resistance 
they hoped would be solid enough to hold back the tides of change rolling through the 
South in 1963. Similar to the desegregation of the public library in 1960, local authorities 
in Danville aimed to ignore and even override national policies and federal court orders 
in an attempt to maintain control over social and political life in Danville. The fight over 
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civil rights in Danville came to be more than just black equality versus white supremacy, 
but also local versus national. Black citizens in Danville led the civil rights battle backed 
by national organizations and leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr., the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference, and Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. 
These organizations brought with them resources in the form of organizers, speakers, 
secretaries, photographers, writers, money, and more in hopes of turning the tide in favor 
of civil rights achievement in Danville. Yet, despite help from such prominent national 
groups and figures, white resistance in Danville still had a greater advantage over the 
protestors. It seemed to be that no amount of money and national resources would be 
enough to successfully fight a local system of white political power that was reinforced 
by a violent police department and racist legal system.  
Mayor Julian Stinson and city manager Edward Temple, both of whom held the 
same respective positions during the library fight two years earlier, were quick to speak 
out after the first arrests on June 5th. In a statement to the Register, Stinson commended 
police chief Eugene McCain for calling in the fire trucks as a threat to the crowd, and 
praised them on the restraint they were able to show “in the face of an unfortunate 
situation.”121 The fire hoses were not used on demonstrators during this encounter, but 
the threat they would be deployed if needed was enough to make much of the young 
crowd disperse. Stinson’s praise of restraint also indicates an acknowledgement by him 
that the use of firehoses on demonstrators could be extremely dangerous, yet clearly a 
necessary step if the protestors did not clear the town hall steps. The fire department was 
called in by Chief McCain only a few days after the protests started, and the speed at 
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which the fire department was used as a dispersal tactic, coupled with its endorsement by 
the mayor, was a clear indication that key power structures in Danville had no intention 
of even considering listening to the civil rights marches, and were more than willing to 
resort to violence in order to silence them.  
Mayor Stinson also demeaned the protestors by claiming their actions would have 
a negative effect on the industry which was planning to come to Danville, an industry 
Stinson stated would mean jobs for both black and white citizens. Stinson’s comment 
casts blame on the black community for their own economic misfortunes by insinuating it 
was their own actions that keep beneficial jobs out of the city. His comments also echo a 
similar concern expressed by white citizens during the library fight two years earlier. As 
seen during city council meetings in 1960, there was a collective white concern that civil 
rights protests would harm whites in Danville by creating an environment that no 
industry would want to settle. Stinson’s comments demonstrates both a strategy and 
concept of white thought in Danville that sought to blame black civil rights seekers as 
those responsible for the city’s problems, specifically causing a threat to industry in this 
case. The implication is also that the fault lies specifically with the protestors, as it was 
the “responsible” African American citizens who did not participate in the 
demonstrations.122 Additionally, in making such public comments, Mayor Stinson is 
convincing the white public to perceive the movement and demonstrators as he does, as 
well as to justify the action of the Danville police department and Judge Aiken. While 
many other resistance tactics by Danville authorities were aimed at the protestors 
themselves, Stinson was simultaneously emitting a message to the public that aims to 
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keep white citizens in line regarding the civil rights movement, who is perpetuating the 
chaos, and the justifications for violent and legal avenues need to be taken to restrain 
them.  
Mayor Stinson made it clear at the start of the protests that he had no intention of 
meeting with anyone who had been arrested during a demonstration, many of whom were 
the leaders of the movement, and in doing so he surely cut himself off from the people 
that were most desperate to talk to him. About six weeks into the protest, the mayor and 
city manager Temple met with a group of “responsible negroes” whom Stinson claimed 
were leaders in search of black community progress, yet had stayed away from the 
summer demonstration.123 He also made the bold claims that some of the people with 
whom he would be meeting had been discussing progressive issues with him “for the last 
five years” and insisted “communications with the Negro citizens of Danville have never 
been cut off at the hands of the mayor or city manager.”124  
Both of Mayor Stinson’s statements seem significantly far from the truth when 
considering the events of the 1963 summer and the library battle of 1960. During the 
months-long legal fight over the desegregation of the public library two years prior, it 
does not appear that Stinson ever made any public comments indicating he was meeting 
with “responsible” black citizens who desired racial progress in the city.125 If this were 
true, it is very likely it would have been printed in the newspaper. Additionally, it appears 
that communication was in fact cut off by the city mayor both in 1960 and 1963. The 
1963 demonstrators were eager to talk to both Mayor Stinson and Temple, which is why 
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the marches were carried out at the municipal building in the first place.126 This is also 
the reason demonstrators entered the building and headed to the floor where Manager 
Temple’s office was located, yet Temple did not meet or speak with any demonstrators 
there during the first days of protests. Stinson and Temple’s actions reflect the truth of the 
situation, which was that white city leadership that had no intention of meeting or 
listening to the demands of protestors, but rather put out messages to the public that 
continued to demean demonstrators and portray them as irresponsible trouble-makers. 
 
One of the most powerful mechanisms for resisting the local civil rights 
movement and maintaining an order of white supremacy in Danville was the Danville 
Police Force. Eugene McCain served as police chief in 1963, a job title undoubtedly 
earned through this twenty-three years of service to the DPD.127 There is little known 
about Chief McCain’s personal life, but through his actions it is evident he firmly 
supported the agenda of white city leadership. His leadership techniques and utilization 
of his officers during the Danville protests mirrored that of police action in Birmingham, 
likely explaining why SNCC activist Robert Zellner later referred to McCain as a “Bull 
Connor type.”128 It was McCain’s decision on the violent night of June 10th to call in the 
Danville fire department, urged on by Mayor Stinson who told McCain to “give ‘em all 
you’ve got.”129 That particular day there were thirty-eight demonstrators arrested during 
the day’s events, and that night a group of sixty-five demonstrators marched to the jail to 
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pray and sing. The group was led by another local church leader, Reverend H. McGhee, 
and Gloria Campbell the wife of leader Reverend Lawrence Campbell who had also been 
arrested that day.130 Recollections from demonstrators state that they marched from Bible 
Way church to the city jail, and planned to surround it and pray for those arrested.131 
Demonstrators claim that police attacked as they were kneeling to pray, but McCain 
states in his court testimony during the trials that fall that the group was rowdy and 
attempting to storm the jail.132  
McCain had already called the fire trucks in several days prior to threaten the 
protestors, yet this time when the crowd remained undaunted by their appearance the 
police chief ordered the hoses to be released directly on the demonstrators. In the 
aftermath, protestors would describe how when they fled from the hoses, McCain had 
them cornered next to the jail with another truck.133 McCain essentially admitted to this 
in his court testimony months later, acknowledging that because the hoses would not 
reach the protestors he ordered another truck pull in behind them and release the hoses.134 
Protestors recall how people were knocked to the ground and sent sliding down the street 
“the way rain washes away trash during a storm.”135 Once sprayed to the ground, the 
police descended on the wet and injured protestors, beating and arresting many. Though 
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records only exists for thirteen individuals, there are reports that say more than forty 
needed medical attention at the all-black Winslow Hospital.136  
Dorothy Zellner, SNCC activist who was attacked by police on the night of 
Bloody Monday, wrote of the demonstrators in her pamphlet, “Danville, Virginia.” 
Zellner wrote with great detail of the attacks on demonstrators the night of Bloody 
Monday, when Chief McCain used the fire department to wash protestors away from the 
jail, and the police used batons and dogs to attack peaceful demonstrators clamoring for 
safety. Zellner describes how about sixty-five demonstrators, including several of the 
SNCC activists, marched to surround the jail and sing hymns in support of those arrested 
earlier in the day. Reverend Campbell and several of the other had been arrested, so the 
group was led by Campbell’s wife, Gloria, and Reverend McGhee. As the group 
approached the police tried to stop them, smashing Robert Zellner’s camera and 
demanding Reverend McGhee disperse the crowd. Instead, when the reverend began to 
pray Chief McCain gave the orders to the waiting fire trucks to “Let ‘em have it.”137 
Gloria Campbell’s testimony reinforces this account, claiming that Chief McCain 
personally beat her with a baton while demonstrators were attacked by dogs and “hosed 
down to the ground and washed away like trash”.138  
The level of violence inflicted onto protestors by police in Danville seemed to be 
an innate reaction to the chaos and unpreparedness of the police department in response 
to an unexpected civil rights movement. Whether Danville police believed themselves to 
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be ill-equipped in numbers, or seeking to create a more intimidating presence, they also 
brought in assistance from the state police and deputized white garbage collectors and 
bus drivers from the street.139 Resorting to violence so soon into the protest movement 
indicates a heightened fear at the potential loss of white power in the city. The black 
citizenry had been making slow steps towards equality since the desegregation of the 
public library, but the direct protests were different. They were a visible threat in a way 
that the legal battles behind closed doors had never been. Lawsuits were one thing, but 
ongoing protests by hundreds right in front of the city government offices were another. 
One year after the Danville protests police captain Juby Towler published a book 
titled The Police Roll in Racial Conflicts intended to guide to other police officers and 
departments in the South on how to properly handle racial demonstrations as the civil 
rights movement intensified. Towler states at the beginning of he book will focus on the 
morality of the policeman’s “obligations, responsibility, duty, and his respect for his role 
in maintaining law and order.”140 Though the book never blatantly says it is about the 
events in Danville, Towler only served as an officer of the DPD throughout his career, 
thus his only experience in dealing with “racial conflict” must have come from the 
Danville protests. Additionally, all of the pictures and events referenced in the book very 
clearly depict the events that took place in downtown Danville during the summer of 
1963. It is uncertain how many copies were printed of Towler’s book or how widespread 
its usage was, but after the book’s first printing in 1964 there was a second printing done 
by the original publishers five years later in 1969. The book also received high reviews 
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from Police-Law Digest and The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police 
Science.141 In an analysis of Towler’s book, a clearer picture of Danville police 
motivations and actions to uphold white supremacy during the protest movement 
becomes evident. Through Towler’s writing a visual of the Danville police response to 
and perception of the movement emerges. 
Towler sets the tone for his book in the first chapter, “Background or Basic 
Understanding” by detailing what police departments utilizing this guide should 
understand about black citizens and civil rights protestors at their most basic level: that 
black persons are impressionable to outside agitators, protestors fake injuries in order to 
portray unrealistic violence to the media, and that demonstrators do not believe the law 
applies to them simply because they believe the law is unfair.142 He writes that police 
must consider that “the negro race may or may not have an inherent weakness for being 
easily incited to action” by those from national organizations that claim to bring peace 
but only incite chaos and lawlessness.143 Towler’s choice to focus on the chaos brought 
by outside organizations likely mirrors the DPD response to the presence of SNCC, the 
SCLC, and other national figures in Danville during the civil rights marches. SNCC’s 
tactic of hosting workshops, those of which were held at High Street Baptist Church in 
Danville, was common knowledge to both protestors and police.144 Towler wrote that 
these workshops cast a hypnotical spell over the demonstrators, which cause the muscles 
of those who march to “twitch spasmodically, and their minds seem to be removed from 
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immediate comprehension.”145 If it is true that demonstrators who were arrested twitched 
or appeared to be in a daze, the answer for such behavior may lie in the fear they felt at 
being arrested by a violent police force rather than a “self-induced hypnotism.”146 
Towler’s assessment ultimately portrays civil rights demonstrators as having weak and 
impressionable minds which are easily subject to manipulation tactics.  
This is similar to the tone the Register undertook during the demonstrations as 
they portrayed the movement as being fueled by outside agitators who had nothing to do 
with Danville.147 It also reinforces the comments made by Mayor Stinson about meeting 
with “responsible” black citizens to discuss racial progress in Danville, indicating that the 
black leaders and participants of the movement in Danville were irresponsible.148 These 
comments and suppositions made by leadership in the city demonstrate that these white 
institutions of power were working together, whether intentionally or not, to actively put 
out the message to the public that African Americans who participated in civil rights 
demonstrations were inferior, weak-minded, and had no real self-motivation to participate 
in the movement themselves. Rather, they had been stirred up by national forces outside 
of Danville and thus did not reflect the real wishes of the black community in the city. 
Though the Register’s publishing of the mayor’s comments likely only reached 
Danville’s citizens, it is almost a certainty that Towler’s book reached many more. 
Towler’s target audience were those that were responsible for directing the physical force 
behind resisting the civil rights movement: southern policemen.  The extent of the 
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potential damage that Towler’s guide to the proper police role in “racial conflicts” is 
impossible to know, but it is not unreasonable to suppose the same attitudes taken on by 
the Danville police force, later to be published in Towler’s book, influenced many other 
police forces throughout the South during the civil rights movement.  
Towler also minimizes the extent of police violence by claiming protestors 
intentionally scraped their face on the ground and practiced wincing in front of cameras, 
as well as staging scenes during the protest to make it appear as though the police were 
being violent or acting improperly, even though they were not (according to Towler).149 
For example, on page 29 of Towler’s book there is a picture of a black protestor who 
looks to have fallen on the ground and two police officer leaning over him. One officer 
has a night stick in his hand, and the other holds his left foot up as if he was caught mid-
kick by the camera. Towler uses this instance to instruct other policemen not to issue 
nightsticks to officers who are untrained in being able to identify situations such as this, 
where the protestor will put on a fake grimace in front of the camera. This picture “worth 
1000 words, may then go public and make the officer look like the one committing the 
wrong in the situation when, in reality, it was clearly the law-breaking protestor.150 
In an interesting twist, Towler does not reference the use of firehoses as a tactic in 
any sort of way, though it was clearly used by the Danville police department multiple 
times.151 It may be that Towler did not agree with Chief McCain’s use of the firehoses, as 
he considered those to be too violent of a method, or at least one that brought the police 
department bad press.  
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On the opposite side of Towler’s book which portrays civil rights demonstrators as 
mindless degenerates, his writings also lend insight into the disorganization and 
miscommunication experienced by the DPD in their handling of the demonstrations. A 
few of his summarizing points in the final chapter include “Don’t issue guns and night 
sticks to untrained men”, “Don’t let prisoners be manhandled”, “Do give thought to 
eliminating confusion”, and “Do give thought to simple selective assignment of police 
personnel to insure calmest performers in most hectic duties.”152 There are very few 
sources available from the civil rights movement in Danville that come from the police 
perspective. In the last sixty years, evidence has been destroyed, notes thrown away, and 
arrest reports long discarded.153 Thus, Towler’s book serves as an invaluable piece of 
evidence in lending insight to the police approach during the movement. In its totality, 
the book represents the thought behind the all-white Danville Police Force which fought 
violently to put down the protests and maintain an order of white supremacy in Danville.  
 
 The end of June brought the end of the first month of the direct protest phase of 
the civil rights movement in Danville. White resistance adapted quickly, utilizing their 
political power and influence to sway the white citizenry, change laws, and transform 
police techniques in order to put an end to the movement as quickly as they could. Their 
combined efforts and willingness to utilize violence led to mass arrests, which left 
protestors fearful and the movement with fewer and fewer resources after each 
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demonstration. Even with the support from national civil rights groups like the SCLC and 
SNCC, the movement was slowly draining away. July would bring a new phase to the 
movement. As demonstrations began to die down, black city leadership would adapt as 
best they could while their resources dwindled, massive arrests perpetuated, and their 
relationships with outside organizations deteriorated. White resistance tactics would also 
continue adapting, but unlike the demonstration movement, their institutional power 
permitted them to remain steady and intense in their fight against civil rights. The protest 
movement was nearly over, but the ongoing battle would soon move from the streets 








 The most notable event in the national civil rights movement took place on 
August 28th, 1963. The March for Jobs and Freedom in Washington D.C. drew national 
attention as more than 200,000 demonstrators flooded the national mall. It was a 
scorching hot day, yet protestors still marches in the same fashion as many of the 
marches in the years prior had been carried out, with plenty of signs, singing, and 
clapping. The intent behind the march was to pressure legislators in Washington to push 
for more comprehensive civil rights for black Americans.154 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. 
delivered his famous “I Have a Dream Speech” about his hopes for the future of black 
Americans and their children. King used his speech to speak against the horrors of racism 
in 1963 America, including segregation, economic injustice, and police brutality.155 This 
landmark event marked a turning point in civil rights history as it pushed lawmakers in 
Washington to craft widespread civil rights legislation which eventually led to the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.156  
Many of King’s sentiments from his speech reflect the injustices faced by African 
Americans all throughout the South, including those living in Danville, Virginia. Though 
King’s speech at Washington was not the same as the one he delivered at High Street 
Baptist Church in Danville the previous month, his statements that civil rights activists 
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“will not be satisfied until justice rolls down like waters and righteousness like a mighty 
stream” closely mirrored his famous line from his Danville speech that “justice would 
flow over Danville like water from a mighty stream.”157 King’s heavy emphasis on the 
need for economic justice nationally for black Americans is an echo of the demands of 
the DCPA in Danville for job equality and the rationale behind their city-wide boycott of 
businesses that refused to hire black workers. His references to intense police brutality 
also closely mirrored the situation in Danville, where protestors had been faced by a 
militant police department all summer. The 200,000 marchers listening to King speak 
knew all too well the struggles highlighted in his speech. To them, and to the protestors in 
Danville fighting for their rights, the horrors of social, political, and economic injustice 
were a lived experience every day. 
Danville resident and civil rights activist Carolyn Wilson recalled traveling to the 
March on Washington to participate in the historic event with other demonstrators from 
Danville. Fifty-two years had passed, and some of her memories were foggy. She 
couldn’t remember how many people went, just that they were all so excited on the bus 
trip up north. They left Danville from High Street Baptist Church incredibly early in the 
morning to begin the journey, and stayed with a kind Jewish family in Maryland the night 
before the march. The morning of the march they drove into Washington D.C. to meet the 
crowds of hundreds of thousands just like them. This time, thankfully, they were able to 
march surrounded by like-minded people without being attacked by police or thrown in 
jail. Only fourteen years old in 1963, Carolyn recalled that she never thought about her 
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participation in the movement that summer as something historic, or as a national 
movement that would be written about in history books years later. “We were just doing 
what we thought was right,” she said. When asked what it was like to attend the March 
on Washington with her fellow justice-seeking friends, her eyes became teary and her 
hands clasped together over her chest. “It was magnificent.”158 
 August of 1963 marked a turning point in the national civil rights narrative, and a 
turning point in the Danville movement as well. The direct-protest action phase of the 
movement would come to a close as the fight moved from the streets and into the 
courtroom. White authorities would continue working together in Danville to ensure the 
movement was defeated legally just as it had been defeated physically in the city. There 
were some immediate, tangible gains that would result from the demonstrator’s efforts. 
The integration of George Washington High School took place that month when five 
black students, all children of local demonstrators, attended classes at the formerly all-
white high school.159 In the following months, the city would hire its first black police 
officer in seventy years and businesses would finally begin caving to the boycott and 
hiring black clerks in department stores.160 These small steps were notable, especially 
when faced with such strong white resistance in the city. However, white authorities in 
the street and courtrooms were the ones who held the real institutional power. Working 
together to form a barrier of extreme white resistance to the Danville civil rights 
movement, Judge Aiken, prosecutor Ferguson, and councilman-turned-prosecutor John 
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Carter dominated local legal battles against demonstrators and the NAACP in the years 
following the Danville movement. In the decade following the end of the Danville 
movement, a tumultuous ride of wins and losses on each side would continue to rage on. 
Ultimately, the goals of the movement were unable to be realized in the face of an 
insurmountable barrier of white power that controlled social, political, and legal life in 








“But it was difficult to mobilize masses under conditions of intense and sustained 
repression…The administration of justice in Danville was by now such a farce that this 
sort of nonsense had become standard practice.” 
 
-Robert Zellner, activist of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee on Danville  
 
 
 As the hot summer progressed into July, the Danville movement dwindled 
significantly until coming to a complete halt in August of 1963. The DCPA fought 
tirelessly to keep the movement alive, but it seemed that weeks of violence and turmoil 
had drained the resources and willpower of Danville’s civil rights protesters. The 
Register’s mischaracterized and belittling reports of the events had ensured no city-based 
white support would offer themselves to aid the movement. Though a few white 
resources from outside Danville came to offer their help, it was no use. The Danville 
Police Department had arrested hundreds of black citizens, many of whom were facing 
large fines and would be required to take days off from work to attend court hearings. 
The NAACP and DCPA tried to pay as many legal fees as they could, but the financial 
burden of so many arrested and court hearings obliterated the organizations’ funds for the 
Danville movement. One by one, SNCC activists fled south away from Danville to 
escape a definite prison sentence that was waiting for them if they stayed to see their day 
in court. African Americans were terrified for their safety, and began showing up to 
demonstrate less and less. There would still be a few small wins granted to black citizens 
in the fallout of the movement, but they seemed insignificant in the face of months’ worth 
of hard work and organizing. By the time the nation watched Martin Luther King Jr. 




rights movement had come to a close. Though the movement had brought about a few 
pieces of tangible change to the city, white resistance fueled by institutional privilege, 
control, and leadership in Danville would emerge the victor at the end of the summer. 
 Following the end of the direct action, a significant transition in the Danville civil 
rights movement occurred. Though the protest movement had wound down after an 
intense two months, there was still a legal fight to be carried out in the courtroom. 
Hundreds of demonstrators had been arrested and would have to show their faces in 
court, and both NAACP defense lawyers and city prosecutors geared up for what 
everyone anticipated would be months of drawn-out court battles. Rather than months, 
the legal fallout from the Danville movement perpetuated for an entire decade as court 
trials were held, decisions made then appealed, and state and federal courts became 
involved. The trial transcripts provide further insights into the powerful force of white 
institutions of justice in Danville, highlighting the nearly insurmountable obstacles faced 
by demonstrators when they saw their day in court. Charged in violation of laws that had 
been crafted specifically to target the Danville civil rights participants, defendants found 
themselves in a courtroom fighting against the very individuals responsible for creating 
those laws, primary Judge Aiken city councilman-turned-prosecutor John Carter. Judge 
Aiken, along with prosecutors Carter and James Ferguson had the power to ensure no 
black protestor in Danville would see a fair trial. 
 
 The once organized and fiery movement slowly began to unravel as July passed. 




Danville to deliver a speech at a very full High Street Baptist church on July 11th .161 
Earlier in the day a small demonstration had taken place downtown once again at the 
steps of city hall, which at this point had been barricaded. SNCC field secretary Bob 
Zellner wrote that two other SNCC workers, Sam Shirah and Daniel Foss, were 
observing the protest when they were sized by Virginia State Trooper and four detectives. 
Zellner also wrote that Shirah was taken to the police station and severely beaten, 
emerging later with an injured right leg and ripped clothes.162 In response to Shirah’s 
beating, masses of students marched downtown in protest approximately sixty of them 
are arrested.163 After a full day of events, the crowd at High Street Baptist Church was 
sweaty, exhausted, and motivated. King’s address, in which he boldly declared “justice 
will flow over Danville like a stream from mighty water,” was met by an eruption of 
applause from the audience.164 
Stirred to action once more from the day’s events and King’s words, members of 
the crowd begged King to march downtown with them, but he ultimately refused their 
pleas with the excuse he was experiencing stomach trouble. King then headed to the 
airport to exit the city as soon as he could, leaving Danville with only his words for the 
second time in six months.165 Unwilling to be deterred by his refusal, over one hundred 
people left the church to make the short march to city hall. Chief McCain met them at the 
city hall steps, confronting the group with a militant police force and racial slurs. “Why 
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don’t you n***** get on back where you came from?” McCain reportedly asked as the 
crowd began to disburse.166 There wasn’t any violence that evening, but another thirteen 
arrests carried out, which brought the day’s total to around seventy-five arrests. Fueled 
with the excitement and resolve from the day prior, the following day several more 
demonstrations took place, and between twenty-five and thirty persons were arrested. The 
total number of jailed protestors had risen to over one hundred in just forty-eight hours.167 
The July 12th headline of the Register announced “Police Halt March After King 
Talks and Negroes Walk,” including pictures of Martin Luther King Jr. with Danville 
leader Reverend Chase, a woman holding a protest sign, and a picture from inside the 
High Street Baptist Church. The picture from inside the church only shows one side of 
the large auditorium, with the caption “Small audience hears King in first speech of day,” 
even though the room is clearly holding a significant number of people. The rest of the 
article focuses on the demonstrations of the previous day, and brings the perspective of 
white power and authority to the story of the day’s events. In describing the large 
amounts of arrests that were carried out during the day, most of whom were students and 
young adults, the article states the police were “accommodating the Negroes in their 
wishes to “fill the jails”.” This rhetoric is almost an exact replica of the stories published 
by the Register during the Birmingham, Alabama march a month prior. In Birmingham, 
the police had “obliged” the protestors when they chanted “fill the jails.” Now, in 
Danville, the police "obliged” their own demonstrators who chanted the same things.168 
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Reporting such as this kept the fault of disruption and violence in Danville with the black 
demonstrators, and ensured that the paper’s wide white readership knew who to blame for 
the chaos downtown. Another white city paper, The Bee, characterized King’s speech and 
subsequent demonstrating as “a hit-and-run commando raid”.169 
 The Bee article also includes similar sentiments, but goes a step further by 
explaining a multitude of perceived white generosities to the black community. To the 
white reader, not only were the black demonstrators bringing harm to themselves by 
asking the police to essentially react with force and massive arrests, but their actions 
seemed especially heinous in light of the overwhelming white generosity offered to the 
black community in the years leading up to the demonstrations. An unnamed author 
wrote,   
“ Not many other Southern communities can boast of what we have done of 
recent years for the Negro community. We have given it a million dollar high school, a 
city operated hospital, a generous welfare and social services policy, two all-Negro 
developments providing attractive homes, and destruction of the unsightly subnormal 
dwellings. We have given and continue to make a contribution to seasonal unemployment 
by giving equal pay to Negroes employed in like capacity. And yet, in spite of these 
progressions an element of our Negro population allows itself to be led by the halter into 
the vicissitudes which today beset us.”170 
 
 The implication of this comment is that white leadership in Danville had given the black 
community everything it needed and more prior to the protest movement. The had their 
own schools, a hospital, and, supposedly, better housing. However, nothing in this list the 
author has curated has anything to do with the real demands of the demonstrators which 
they had proclaimed since the start of the movement. Leaders of the Danville civil rights 
movement wanted equal employment opportunities and an end to segregation, but their 
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demands had fallen on deaf ears since the start of the movement. The Danville 
newspapers carried no real weight in political or legal decisions over the course of the 
summer, but they did hold a strong social significance. In catering to white segregationist 
sympathies throughout the course of the summer, Danville papers, especially the 
Register, had served to reinforce the ideologies of Danville authorities and ensure a 
negative public portrayal of the national and local civil rights movement. 
Further newspaper reports after King’s visit to Danville lend insight into how 
misguided the public white perspective was when it came to the protest movement in the 
city. After King’s visit to Danville and speech at High Street Baptist Church, the Register 
and The Bee placed King at the fault behind the rush of protesting after his speeches, and 
immediately elevated him to a place of significance within the Danville civil rights 
movement. The Register headlines included “Police Halt March After King Talks And 
Negroes Walk” and “King’s Many Boasts – All Empty!” along with the earlier 
referenced piece from The Bee, “Fanning the Flames” which blamed King for the 
continued uproar in Danville.171 In treating King, the SCLC, SNCC, and other whites 
from outside Danville who came to offer their support as outside agitators who did not 
represent the views of the city, the paper created the public perception that Danville was a 
city under attack from a liberal agenda, rather than the grass-roots organization it truly 
was. The incorporation of these national figures and organizations was intended to revive 
the movement after weeks of exhaustive marching and protesting, yet it is likely this 
inclusion actually hastened the movement’s demise. The perpetuated narrative by the 
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city’s primary white-controlled newspaper reinforced the negative public perception of 
protestors and created even more barriers for the movement to face.  
After King’s departure and deeper fissures forming in the movement, one last, 
massive protest event was planned for downtown. It would be called D-Day, short for 
“demonstration day,” and Reverend Campbell declared that over 1,000 individuals would 
show up to pledge their support.172According to SNCC secretary Robert Zellner, D-Day 
was initially scheduled for July 21st, but Reverend Campbell, who had been gathering 
signatures of support, decided to push back the event by one week. Though Zellner 
doesn’t explicitly write the reasoning behind this decision, it is likely Campbell was 
trying to buy time in order to gain more tangible support. When D-Day finally did arrive, 
it was a complete disaster. The newspapers had reported that the alleged 1,000 people 
were to show up, but only seventy-seven did, all of whom were arrested and thrown into 
jail. Robert Zellner writes that the demonstrators in Danville were tired and afraid, and 
rightfully so. After experiencing weeks of high-stress marches, police violence, and 
massive arrests accompanied by high bail costs, individuals were worn down. The 
community was bankrupt, as all their funds had been dumped into lawyer fees and bail 
pricing that were accumulating higher and higher with each demonstration. Furthermore, 
the relationship between SNCC and the DCPA began to break down as disagreements 
over tactics and how to push forward arose in the final efforts to sustain the movement. 
By the end of the month, nearly all of the SNCC workers in Danville had fled the state to 
avoid further beatings, arrests, and court battles that would undoubtedly land them in 
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jail.173 The pressure of a white supremacist institution was too great for civil rights 
protestors to overcome, even with national aid and resources sent to aid them. As Zellner 
concludes, “it was difficult to mobilize the masses under conditions of intense and 
sustained repression…”174 Under such intense and sustained white pressure, as Zellner 
phrases it, the movement could no longer continue as it had since its conception at the 
end of May. The Danville civil rights movement had burned hot and bright for several 
weeks, but ultimately with no political power or allies in Danville’s white institutions, the 
movement was extinguished. . 
 
 
Moving into August, there were no longer any mass demonstrations or organizing 
hundreds of protestors to descend on city hall. The pubic organizing and demonstrations 
of the Danville civil rights movement was over, even as leaders scrambled to find ways to 
keep the fight alive. When school started that month, seven black students were selected 
to attend the formerly all-white George Washington High School. This was the first 
integration of any public schools in the city, and the students chosen to integrate were all 
children of the movement’s leaders.175 The DCPA had been encouraging a boycott all 
summer of businesses that refused to employ African Americans, and sometime that fall 
the first black clerk at a local department store was hired. More soon followed, as the 
boycott was successful in affecting white-owned businesses.176 There were even local 
Jewish business owners who had given money to the movement over the summer in an 
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effort to relieve the economic pressure brought on by the DCPA boycott.177 In October, 
the first black policeman in over ninety years was hired at the Danville Police 
Department, though Chief McCain made sure to state it was only because there were not 
enough suitable candidates to choose from. There was a brief glimmer of hope the direct 
protest movement would revive itself that November when Martin Luther King Jr. swore 
he would return to Danville and lead another demonstration in the city, but, as Robert 
Zellner writes, “the Messiah never showed up.”  
The black community had secured a few tangible victories since the start of the 
movement in the late spring, and the phase of the movement consisting of direct protest 
action and demands for economic and social equality were over. Though the outcome 
was not nearly what civil rights leadership had desired, the victories there were able to 
accomplish in the face of such intense repression was certainly notable. However, white 
city leadership was far from satisfied with the outcome of the movement. Enraged that 
such an affront to social order had been brought to the city, Judge Aiken, Danville police 
officers, and Councilman John Carter were set to get their revenge through months of 
ongoing court proceedings that would continue to place a significant economic toll on 
demonstrators and their families. In addition to court costs and bail money, city attorneys 
sought to humiliate and downgrade the civil rights participants and thugs, criminals, and 
liars. The local branch of the NAACP utilized its best lawyers, Ruth Harvey Wood and 
Jerry Williams, to defend demonstrators and cross-examine police, but it was of little use. 
The court trials following the end of the movement reinforced that oppressive systems of 
 




white power in Danville had barely faltered during the course of the movement, and they 
ensured to make a mockery of the black citizens who had fought for their civil rights.  
The trials of demonstrators began in July, kicking off what would become years 
of bitter court battles. By the start of the trials over 250 demonstrators had been arrested 
and were charged with “contempt, trespassing, disorderly conduct, assault, parading 
without a permit, and resisting arrest.”178 There were also many parents charged with 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor for allowing their children to participate in the 
demonstrations. Local lawyers Ruth L. Harvey and Jerry Williams, both affiliated with 
the NAACP, along with NAACP lawyer Len Holt from Norfolk, took the job of 
defending demonstrators.179 It was Jerry Williams’ sons, Robert and Jerry Jr., who had 
participated in the sit-in at the public library two years prior to start the direct protest 
movement in the city. Now, their father would be responsible for continuing the civil 
rights fight from the legal side by defending those arrested during the summer’s many 
protests. The defense group attempted to get the demonstrators’ cases moved from 
corporation to federal courts, but each of the defendants were insistent they wanted their 
own day in court. Scheduling so many trials overran the court docket schedules for the 
coming months, and all cases not related to civil rights arrests were pushed back to a 
significantly later date.180  
The city prosecutors representing Danville were none other than attorney James 
Ferguson and councilman John Carter, two of the most prevalent and powerful 
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individuals who had led the segregationist cause during the fight for the library three 
years earlier. Ferguson had been exasperated at the state court’s ruling that allowed black 
citizens to use the formerly all-white public library at the Sutherlin Mansion. If Ferguson 
thought the idea of black citizens being in the Confederate library was “blasphemous,” it 
is likely he found protestor’s demands for equal rights, access to private and public 
facilities, and fair economic opportunity equally repulsive.181 His 1960 loss in federal 
court no doubt left him with a bitter attitude towards black civil rights activists, and the 
prosecution of demonstrators in 1963 presented an opportunity to redeem himself. Like 
Ferguson, councilman John Carter had also suffered a humiliating loss in the aftermath of 
the federal decision to open Danville’s public libraries to all citizens regardless of race. 
Not only was Carter leading the fight to close the public libraries completely from his 
position as a city councilmember, but he was also a leading figure in the planning of a 
private library for white citizens. Once city council voted to allow all citizens use the 
library, and their decision was supported by federal courts shortly after, John Carter’s 
work for a private library quickly fell apart. In 1963 he was still serving on city council, 
yet simultaneously took on the role of prosecutor in handling the massive case load that 
came at the end of the movement. In 1960, Carter had been adamant he would never give 
in to the NAACP, and yet he would face them directly in court as both sides fought an 
extension of the battle that had been brewing for the past three years. The pending court 
battles would be a struggle over who held the power in Danville, and it was going to get 
ugly. 
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The first of the trials to take place was The City of Danville, Virginia v. Lawrence 
G. Campbell, et als at the beginning of August in 1963. On trial were Lawrence 
Campbell and other leaders and participants of the movement who had been arrested for 
violating Judge Aiken’s injunction and the John Brown Statute. Arguing for the 
prosecution were James Ferguson and John Carter, with NAACP lawyers Ruth Harvey 
Wood, Jerry Williams, Irwin Miller, and Harry Wood representing the defendants. The 
long lineup of witnesses included key members of the movement and its opposition such 
as Chief Eugene McCain, Juby Towler, T. Edward Temple, Reverend Chase, and Doyle 
Thomas.182 Judge Aiken was the presiding judge, and the transcripts reveal that most of 
the objections made by the NAACP defense council were shut down or brushed off over 
the course of the hearing. Each side had their own story; the defense claimed wrongdoing 
by the city police during the demonstrations, and the prosecution argued they were 
particularly gracious throughout the demonstrations. Altogether, the transcripts from that 
first trial provides thorough insights into the reinforcing facets of white resistance in 
Danville that existed between city leadership, legal system, and police department 
working together to halt the civil rights movement. 
Chief McCain’s questioning by prosecutor Ferguson focused predominately on 
the tactics of the demonstrators since the movement began and followed a chronological 
approach, seemingly trying to construct his argument by demonstrating a pattern of 
widespread disruption to businesses and the downtown areas during the summer. 
McCain’s responses centered around justifying the police department’s actions and mass 
arrests because demonstrators would not listen to police order to disperse from the 
 




sidewalks and roadways. McCain’s account lacks a description of any police violence 
whatsoever, even on the violent and chaotic night of Bloody Monday. McCain’s 
description of the night was brief when asked by Ferguson what transpired, and stated 
that he only the demonstrators had marched to the jail and refused to disperse. “They 
wouldn’t leave, again being told to do so. And I told the fire department to turn the water 
on them, which they did.”183 Gloria Campbell and SNCC activist Dorothy Zellner both 
testified later on the group had been praying when the fire hoses were turned on them, 
something that McCain does not address.184 Afterwords, Ferguson asked McCain if the 
water hoses dispersed the crowd and McCain responded that the crowd had not broken 
up, so he sent his officers in “to pull them aloose from the cars and from each other.”185 
In spite of this claim, the multiple witness accounts, hospital records, and photographs of 
banged headwounds of demonstrators, indicate that McCain’s men did significantly more 
than just “pull them aloose”. They severely beat protestors as well.186 
Irwin Miller’s cross examination was quite different from Ferguson’s initial 
questioning of McCain. Miller attempted to ask McCain more pointed questions about his 
and the police department’s actions in enforcing Judge Aiken’s injunction, but was asked 
interrupted by attorney Ferguson and dismissed by Judge Aiken. When Miller asks 
McCain if he was aware of the numerous individuals who needed treatment at Winslow 
hospital after the night of Bloody Monday, Ferguson interrupts and tries to answer the 
question himself. Ferguson openly admitted there were some African Americans who 
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went to the hospital for first aid that night, but there was no proof they had taken part in 
the demonstration, and “that’s as far as the Chief can testify.”187 Chief McCain goes on to 
state essentially the same thing Ferguson had just said, and that he didn’t know the extent 
of any injuries that may have occurred.188 Later, Miller attempts to ask McCain if he 
could prove that there were citizens in Danville complaining of the demonstrations 
downtown by producing the letters of complaint McCain claimed existed. Ferguson 
objects over the relevancy of such complaints, and Aiken agrees and dismisses the line of 
questioning as immaterial.189 As Miller tries to hand off examination to co-counsel Ruth 
Harvey Wood, Aiken refuses to allow it, claiming that in the interest of brevity only one 
member of counsel is permitted to examine each witness.190 The exact time that Ferguson 
was permitted by the court to question McCain is unknown, but the trial transcript shows 
that Ferguson’s questioning took up over 100 pages, while Miller’s cross examination 
was significantly shorter in both page length and actually questioning considering the 
multiple interruptions.191   
The rest of the witness testimony followed a similar pattern, with Judge Aiken 
showing considerable leniency with Carter and Ferguson, yet eager to shut down and 
begrudge the work of the NAACP defense lawyers. Ferguson and Carter worked 
diligently to go through each day of the protest movement in an effort to portray the 
movement as orchestrated by dangerous outsiders who had flocked to Danville to cause 
trouble during the summer. At one point during the questioning of Danville police officer 
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Neal Morris, John Carter went through the list of multiple SNCC workers who had come 
to Danville, asked Morris if he knew them, and had Morris state over and over they were 
not natives of the city.192 There were also heated questions between the prosecution and 
defense over whether or not there had been any violence committed by the protestors 
towards police. Officer W.L Osborne claimed his patrol car had been shot at the night of 
Bloody Monday’s events as he drove past Winslow Hospital where the beaten 
demonstrators were being treated.193 Ruth Wood brought an intense cross-examination in 
an effort to illustrate that even if the incidents Osborne was testifying to had occurred, 
there was no proof that the act had been committed by a civil rights protestor. Thus, 
Wood motioned for Osborne’s testimony to be struck from the record as it could not be 
tied in with the demonstrations. Judge Aiken denied her request.194 At the end of the trial, 
all four defendants were convicted.195 
This first trial is important not only for understanding the perspective of police 
and those in power who sought to hinder the movement, but also for recognizing the 
institutional factors that enabled white authorities in Danville to utilize such power while 
simultaneously blocking African Americans from exercising the same rights. In the 
courtroom, Judge Aiken was the voice of authority. This trial specifically was for the 
purpose of deciding whether or not to convict Lawrence Campbell, A. I. Dunlap, Julius 
Adams, and Arthur Pinchback on the charges of violating Aiken’s own injunction and the 
John Brown Statute, which Aiken had convened the grand jury for earlier that summer. 
Judge Aiken had issued the injunction specifically to criminalize any further 
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demonstrations in Danville, so of course he considered the leaders of the continued 
movement to be in violation of his own injunction. Furthermore, the legal representation 
by Ferguson and Carter were leaders in the city committed to upholding white order and 
staunch supporters of Aiken’s injunction. Ferguson had argued for the continued 
exclusion of black patrons three years earlier during the library fight, and Carter was a 
sitting council member when they passed the new addition to the parade ordinance 
specifically targeted at making the downtown demonstrations illegal. Working together, 
these men representing the functions of law and order in the city created web of white 
power that was nearly impenetrable. They could create laws to benefit themselves with 
the power to also enforce those laws in the streets and in the courtroom. Considering such 
an insurmountable system, a victory by the NAACP in the courtroom would have been 
nearly impossible.  
 In September of 1963, a class action lawsuit was filed in the Federal District 
Court for the Western District of Virginia on behalf of Delores J. Page, et als against 
Eugene McCain and the members of city council stating the city’s parade permit was 
unconstitutional.196 That decision was still pending in January when at least seventy-two 
individuals were tried and convicted for violating the Danville City Code Section 16-20. 
This law was the one which prevented parading without a permit and was changed on 
July 10th to make sure it would include the civil rights protestors, and all the appellants 
for this case had been arrested during the failed “Demonstration Day” attempt on July 
28th. In March, NAACP lawyers Ruth Harvey Wood and Jerry Williams, with the 
assistance of Jack Greenberg of New York, represented the defendants as they filed their 
 





appeals claims with the Supreme Court of Appeals in Virginia. The lawyers argued that 
this section was illegal as it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as well as the free speech and rights to assembly and petition found in the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.197 Furthermore, the updated version of the ordinance 
which was passed July 10th was never made public knowledge or published legally so 
that any citizen might be made aware of the updated changes or have access to it.198 In 
supporting their three key arguments as to why the defendants should have their 
convictions overturned, the NAACP cited twenty-eight state and federal court cases.199 
James Ferguson refused to be bested by the NAACP, and filed a brief in opposition of the 
NAACP’s file for an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals in Virginia. However, the 
justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals sided with the NAACP, handing one of a few 
court wins to civil rights in Danville.200 
The civil rights cases from Danville, Virginia, continued to appear in state and 
federal courts for a decade after the movement had actually come to a close. In 1964, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had struck down Judge Aiken’s injunction order by a 
slim margin, 3-2, and a strong dissent supporting the constitutionality of the order based 
off John Brown’s law. Three years later during the appeals process, the state courts 
overturned this ruling in Thomas v. The City of Danville and declared Judge Aiken’s 
injunction constitutional, allowing the court trial to proceed through the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. This ruling was upheld once again in York v. City of Danville. The former 
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rulings were challenged in Rollins v. Commonwealth in 1970, and a victory was given to 
demonstrators when the court ruled that there had to be proof that any demonstrator not 
explicitly listed in the injunction, that is anyone other than Lawrence Campbell, 
Alexander Dunlap, Arthur Pinchback, and Julius Adams, had to have had prior 
knowledge of Aiken’s injunction before violating it. As a result of the court’s decision in 
Rollins v. Commonwealth, the courts overturned the convictions of nearly 270 individuals 
arrested during the 1963 protests. However, those listed specifically in Aiken’s 
injunctions did not have their convictions overturned, but upheld for their violation of the 
law which the courts had deemed constitutional several years prior. The final court 
proceedings from the fallout of the Danville movement came early in 1973 from Judge 
Glynn R. Phillips. Judge Aiken had died two years prior, and the current Danville 
Corporation Court judge had recused himself from the case. Judge Phillips suspended any 
jail sentences that remained, but did order numerous fines to be paid to the city, which in 
total was over $5,000. This action by Judge Phillips was met with intense objection by 
the city’s prosecutors, but their cries fell on deaf ears.201 
The finale to the civil rights court battles in Danville signaled the end of a messy 
and tense decade. The ongoing fight in the courtroom lasted exponentially longer than it 
did in the streets and provides significant insights into how white power in Danville 
adapted itself in order to uphold its continued resistance to black civil rights in the city. 
Judge Aiken was alive and serving as Danville’s Corporation Court judge, yet in the eight 
years between the end of the movement and his death he never rescinded his injunction. 
Doing so would have brought the fight to an end that resulted in all demonstrators, even 
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the ones named in the injunction lawsuit, went free with no fines or penalties. There is no 
doubt that the ongoing trials meant the city incurred exorbitant costs in legal fees, and 
nullifying the injunction may have meant considerable time and money saved for the city 
of Danville. Ten years and 270 people indicates a significant amount of time, money, and 
overall resources being poured into these court trials all so that white power in Danville 
could be afforded the last word on the matter. When Judge Phillips decided to do away 
with the demonstrators’ convictions, white prosecutors objected.202 No matter how long it 
took, if all 270 demonstrators could be convicted then that meant they would be 
criminals, not fighters for justice or equal rights, but law-breakers. The civil rights 
movement in Danville had revealed the force with which white leadership was willing to 
fight back against black equality, but the drawn-out court battles revealed the 
determination and stamina white power was ready to invest in the fight to ensure they 
held onto their power in the end.   
It was clear the defeat of the civil rights movement in Danville was the result of 
an interlocking web of the city’s institutions of white power which worked together to 
reinforce each other’s’ actions and effectively extinguish the Danville movement. The 
Register dominated the local narrative received by the white public and made sure no 
material that favored the demonstrations in any capacity was ever published. Spreading 
misinformation about the movement and its goals, the Register mischaracterized the 
movement to its white readers, effectively curtailing white public support. City leadership 
had never demonstrated a real desire to work with protestors or listen to their demands, 
but instead wrote them off as troublesome, irresponsible criminals. The courts, led by 
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Judge Aiken, ensured that no true justice would ever be shown to any civil rights seeker 
who found themselves in front of the pistol-toting judge. Through intimidation and 
manipulation of the law, Judge Aiken ordered the enforcement of an Antebellum slave 
law that allowed the police to react violently and dangerously towards the city’s black 
citizens. Knowing their actions would be justified by Judge Aiken and the broader white 
public, Chief McCain had borrowed horrendous crowd dispersal techniques used by 
Birmingham, Alabama’s own Bull Connor and perpetuated violence and mass arrests of 
law-abiding protestors in Danville. Mayor Stinson, Judge Aiken, and Chief McCain 
waged war for social and political power in the city, and unlike the demonstrators, they 
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